MSDF destroyer Sazanami carrying out an escort mission in the Gulf of Aden (Source: MoD)
The Japanese government is apparently considering how it will secure its shipping in the event of a breakout of conflict in the Straits of Hormuz, according to Jiji Press (and Nikkei):
Japan Mulling Sending Warships to Strait of Hormuz
The Japanese government is considering whether it is possible for the country to send Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to the Strait of Hormuz to escort oil and gas tankers amid an growing tension in the region over Iran’s nuclear program, informed sources said.
Some 80 pct of crude oil and 20 pct of liquefied natural gas that Japan imports from the Middle East currently pass through the Straits of Hormuz, a crucial gateway to the Persian Gulf.
It is vital for Japan to secure such imports because demand for use in thermal power generation is increasing rapidly in line with the falling operation rate of nuclear power plants following the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant.
However, with Iran threatening to shut the strait to counter sanctions planned by the United States and Europe against its nuclear program, it will be difficult for Japanese-tied carriers to go through the shipping lane if the Middle Eastern nation deploys naval ships and sea mines there.
The Japanese government is thus considering dispatching destroyers to protect Japanese ships there, based on the SDF law that allows troops to be deployed for maritime security, sources familiar with the matter said.
This appears to be an expansion of the principles guiding the anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, and if they were to decide to go ahead with a dispatch, then it is possible that they will allow the vessels of other nations to apply for protection as in the Gulf of Aden. However, this will involve the possibility of Japanese vessels being attacked by another state’s military force, not just a non-state actor such as terrorists or pirates. This in itself seems a major obstacle to the possibility of a deployment and will necessitate neutrality that the Japanese government would be hard to feign given their close ties to the US.
It is essential, as the article mentions, that Japan consider its energy security in the event of conflict with Iran. It will be interesting to see where the government decides to go with this, but while it seems like a good chance for the SDF affirm their alliance with the US by providing an auxiliary role in the Straits, it seems more likely that the government will come down on the path of minimal or non-deployment.
For more on the SDF’s mission in the Gulf of Aden, take a look at this MSDF video (in Japanese):
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A former contributor to World Intelligence (Japan Military Review), James Simpson joined Japan Security Watch in 2011, migrating with his blog Defending Japan. He has a Masters in Security Studies from Aberystwyth University and is currently living in Kawasaki, Japan.
His primary interests include the so-called 'normalization' of Japanese security (i.e. militarization), and the political impact of the abduction issue with North Korea.
James Simpson has 254 post(s) on Japan Security Watch
14 comments
Chuck Hill says:
Feb 20, 2012
There is a good chance there will be a need for minesweepers if Iran does attempt to close the strait.
Would think clearing mines would be an acceptable mission.
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James Simpson says:
Feb 20, 2012
A minesweeper mission is possible, but I can't see it happening until the conflict is resolved (e.g. through a ceasefire) – that is what happened in the Gulf War, in which the deployment of minesweepers wasn't announced until April 24th, nearly two months after the Feb 28th ceasefire.
In all cases, this will be a naval conflict, and deploying naval assets means risking a skirmish. I still can't see the government going for it, regardless of the readiness and willingness of the MSDF itself.
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arkhangelsk says:
Feb 20, 2012
Politically, it is no longer acceptable for Japan since 1990 to fold their arms and wait for the war to end, and they know it.
Given that the mission must be sent before the war is over, based on the current interpretation of Article 9, it is arguably easier to do a Direct Escort mission w/ minesweeper support than a Minesweeper-centered mission.
The latter can be considered an effort "integral" to America's war effort against Iran, and thus a Use of Force (buryoku koushi). Only in Japan can a logistics, resupply or medical effort be considered "use of force", but someone in the Executive took that tack when answering the Diet in 1997 (Heisei 9) and now we all have to live with it.
A direct escort mission, on the other hand, can be interpreted as self-defense.
Strange but true.
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Corey Wallace says:
Feb 20, 2012
I think if this comes to pass then it really is pushing the outer edges of reasonableness – and democracy – of the tool of constitutional interpretation. As you mention in the comments James, the one thing the constitution does specifically say is not allowed is the use of force to solve "international" conflicts which in international law has a very specific meaning.
The real key issue here is that contrary to the Gulf War, which was a UN sponsored collective security mission in response to a provocation by Iraq itself, the political situation around this is more complex. Any attack on Iran is not going to get specific UN backing and thus it would be an "international" conflict in the truest sense – state on state without any mitigating legitimizing dimensions. Worse, any Japanese deployment for example to escort tankers etc could be seen to be part of a US provocation in this particular case – the most likely scenario for Iran shutting access to Hormuz is in response to an Israeli or US attack on Iran in the first place. And even if Japan were to wake up tomorrow with a constitutionally legitimate right to collective self-defense, one would still be justified in wondering whether this would legitimize Japan's participation, even in a support role, in an attack on Iran.
IMHO it is times like this that we can see the value of Article 9. The Japanese leadership right now is willing to do anything to avoid upsetting the US mainly because it is so politically weak and as we have seen the US has the ability to effectively "remove" Japanese PMs. Democracy and a realistic appraisal of Japan's own security interests in this particular situation be damned.
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arkhangelsk says:
Feb 20, 2012
Since Article 9 in its current interpretation complicates almost any kind of deployment they can make, for your last statement to be true, you'll have to say that any form of deployment is a bad idea for Japan. I must respectfully disagree. It is true that joining in the American anti-Iran effort will be a case of Collective Offense, and Japan has no real interest in stopping Iran from getting nukes. Nevertheless, Japan does have a legitimate interest in protecting its own SLOC from foreign shennigans (both US and Iran, probably US will be careful but in a warzone there is such a thing as a mistake). To the extent that's true, it is in Japan's interest to provide escort for its own tankers and like. And realism says that the world will no longer tolerate Japanese free-riding – it must at least escort its own, if not a bit more. That has been true for 20 years.
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Corey Wallace says:
Feb 21, 2012
My overall point is that as long as the Japanese leadership is unable/unwilling to confront the issues for themselves then perhaps restrictions preventing them from enabling and legitimizing idiotic military adventures is not such a bad thing. I am not against all deployments, and the institutional structure of Japan's foreign policymaking has been flexible enough up until now to let Japan make an international contribution.
The option you mention below would be a good example of what a Japanese leadership with a spine would be willing to think about. Or they could pursue the independent "India" option. Effectively, Japan is – and by potentially committing to any deployment in advance of an attack – lowering the costs of actions for Israel and the US.
The problem right now is that while it may be true it is in Japan's interests to protect its access to oil it is ultimately impossible to divorce its actions, especially any pre-emptive ones, from the overall sanctions-attack effort. Thus my final statement about realistic appraisal of interests. For example Japan in its weakness vis-a-vis the US on Iran is/has:
*Undermined its access to long-term energy resources by withdrawing from the Azadegan oil field due to US pressure. This has enabled the Chinese to move in and take up contracts Japan formerly had spent much diplomatic energy on in cultivating.
*Committed to reducing its oil exports from Iran at a time of energy scarcity due to the nuclear issue, which will push up the cost of global oil at a time when Japan's economy can least afford it.
*Helping to lower the costs of action for an attack that will further compound the aforementioned energy problems should Iran take the drastic step of trying to close down the Hormuz in response.
*Could play a part in enabling the nonsensical attack on an adversary (the Iranian regime) that is playing a game of brinkmanship for domestic political gain. The outcome of this ignorance would truly result in a nuclear deterrent being acquired by Iran, and probably many others, thus undermining the diplomatic energy Japan has poured into the nonproliferation regime.
*Eliminate for good the potential for any kind of meaningful reform by contributing to the radicalization of the Iranian population.
*Strengthen the China-Iran partnership which would greatly weaken Japan's influence in the middle east.
So while I support the idea of an "international contribution" and understand the issues with Japan "free-riding" I don't believe they apply in any way in this case. This would truly even more than Iraq be a war of choice and the US and Israel, if they pursue this option further, should be the ones that have to bear all of the costs, including protecting Japanese oil supplies. I know this is wishful thinking but this should be the starting point for Japan to negotiate with the US. Hence, why I say Article 9 is a useful way of ensuring that Japan's weak strategic leadership does not "give it all away" while Japan is still dependent on the US for East Asian regional security. I actually think Obama is not this silly and he is also playing to the crowd during election year. But if not, then it shows an utter contempt for the interests for one its closest global allies.
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arkhangelsk says:
Feb 21, 2012
As you point out, Corey, Article 9 cannot protect Japan from being pressured into taking economic measures, even those that are harmful to itself. Since 1952, it can't prevent it from keeping a "almost-military". Since 1990, it also cannot be used to prevent ALL participation by Japan. Since 2004, it can't be used to prevent Japanese participation before the fight completely goes down.
At this point, they might as well try and gain the benefits from being a good lackey (aka Britain), but what's left of Article 9 prevents them from doing that.
They can also try to be more independent militarily. But on the short-term, the UN resolution I propose below will get entrapped in the whole collective defense interpretation affair.
On the longer term, Japan's vulnerability to America is because it is facing threats that can't be dealt with them on its own, plus it is not confident of the unconditionality of the US-Japan Security Treaty which forces them into trying to become Good Lackey. So if they are able to arm up, they can be less dependent on the States.
The money is there, kind of. They are in a serious budget deficit crisis but that hasn't stopped them from continuing to feed the ever-growing Social Security monster. They can redirect that bludgeoning growth to Defense, if the will is there. If they passed up the GROWTH of Social Security b/w 2009 and 2010, and gave it to Defense, Defense would grow by 50%! I know that theories are out there that say Social Security is good for the economy. I merely point those guys out the window to see what's afflicting the West as a whole currently. Of course, Defense is not too great for the economy but sometimes one has to pay the insurance premiums.
But again, Article 9 gets in the way of that too. I suppose that given a choice, Japanese would prefer to use their military less rather than keep a smaller military. That would likely be true for certain sensitive Asian nations as well, but Article 9 prevents too many Japanese from understanding that you can't have the Smallest Military and Use it the Least at the same time! Instead they scream "Peace! Peace! Peace!" Which ties the politician's hands in this direction too.
They can't be good lackeys and they can't be independent, b/c of Article 9 and the way it affects the Japanese people. So I'll say Article 9 is more a hindrance than a help.
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Tri-ring says:
Feb 20, 2012
Where is the option where the US simply stop their saber rattling and pull the leash on their lap dog.
Neither the US nor Israel have any legitimate reason to attack Iran. If either nation is pulling the nuke card Iran will simply say right back at you since Israel is said to have nukes as well and since neither state can verify that Iran does have nuclear ambitions and are willing to use it against them to the international community it's a case of "Your words against mine" situation in which neither really have any moral high grounds.
Simply put the US has been harassing Iran to a corner so it would solely on US shoulders if Iran decides to attack since it is the US that had cornered them in a tight spot in the first place.
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arkhangelsk says:
Feb 21, 2012
I have to say that my sympathies are also quite with Iran in this case. They aren't saints, hardly a model nation but the oppressing side here is clear. Less than model nations such as the USSR and PRC has held nukes for decades and nothing has happened out of it. I've even heard of arguments that say having nukes forces nations to be more responsible.
Still, whoever is oppressing and whoever is violating, if the trade routes are affected, Japan will suffer greatly, and as such Japan can't pretend nothing is happening or hope to free ride on America's efforts to keep the routes open.
I actually suggest Japan to take this opportunity boldly to lead a third option. Realistically they can't stop the US and its allies (lackeys?) from poking Iran. What they MIGHT be able to do is to push a UNSC resolution that:
A) Expresses concern over recent threats to block the Straits of Hormuz and its effects on the global trade.
B) Recommends the formation of a United Nations Maritime/Air Task Force with the SOLE mission of guaranteeing the safety of merchant traffic traversing the Hormuz.
That's it. No language recommending restraint. No language condemning Iran for NPT violation. Some might call this limited resolution half-baked, but the simplicity and limits of scope prevents anybody from having viable reasons to veto or overly-debate the resolutions. Everyone does have to recognize that merit.
Basically, it will be Japan taking an initiative for the neutral side.
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SDF to Straits of Hormuz? | Japan Security Watch | Piracy Watch … | Piracy Watch says:
Feb 21, 2012
[...] Article source: http://newpacificinstitute.org/jsw/?p=9955 [...]
arkhangelsk says:
Feb 24, 2012
Dear James: I would really like to put this on the F-35 blogpost. Unfortunately, you seem to have linked to the Mainichi article even in your title header, so I am unable to open your post.
Anyway, it is true that Japan needs something to replace the F-4s with, fast. However, I think it is also true Japan's military budget is less tolerant to price increases or other mishaps that befall modern military development than most others nations.
We've all heard about expensive Japanese military equipment. But how often do you hear of horrible price overruns (like Seawolf or JSF). I'll admit the F-2 is the only one ($80->$120 million) in my memory, and that was a co-production project thus maximizing the difficulty in just canceling the thing.
Otherwise, what one sees pretty consistently in Japanese equipment is conservatism. You see imports of items like F-15s, F-4s, Sea Sparrow, which have been in-service in the US for awhile before going into Japan. Even the new destroyers use well-tested weapons systems and lack that state-of-the-art "stealthiness" that marks say French or even Chinese designs.
The conservatism of Japanese equipment has made even Japanese commentators groan.
But apparently Japan cannot afford a Failed Military Project, or at least not one that makes it to the media. Politically, military failures are more explosive and draw more criticism than elsewhere. Also, the money to fix it the hard way often cannot be found in a budget locked to 1% of GNP. To ensure no overruns happen, they have to be conservative. No non-tested components. Workmanlike, not innovative.
(I sometimes wonder whether part of the expense of Japanese military equipment is to guarantee that it might be over-budgeted, but it won't go overbudget).
The JSF reaches the upper bounds of what they were willing to tolerate for the F-X project, which is IIRC 120×10^8 (oku) yen. It is not suprising they are groaning now.
For the final irony, I link to one article: http://sankei.jp.msn.com/world/news/110816/amr110…
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James Simpson says:
Feb 24, 2012
Short news posts with very little from ourselves redirect directly to the original site, but I hadn't thought about how to implement comments – I'll have to reconsider the current means of doing it.
I agree entirely with the conservatism of the MoD when it comes to defence purchases – they have an extremely strict way of handling budgeting on even the smallest most miniscule items.
My main concern is simply that cancelling the purchase mid-way will result in having to go back to the drawing board, which simply adds further cost to the process and increases the lead time to deployment while future projects sneak up. Hopefully it won't come to that, but I don't believe the costs will be reined in as neatly as the MoF hopes.
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Weekend Reading #1 | Welcome to MicroCapitalist Today! says:
Feb 25, 2012
[...] SDF to Straits of Hormuz? Japan Security Watch [...]
Japan May Send Navy Into the Persian Gulf … | Piracy Watch says:
Mar 9, 2012
[...] to Japan Security Watch, Japan is considering sending naval forces into the Persian Gulf to escort its tankers in the event [...]