Almost as a if it was a direct response to the previous article by Peter Ennis linked to by James Simpson, the Centre for Strategic International Studies “Japan Chair Platform” has published a piece by Dr. Jeff Hornung called “Questioning the Senators’ Proposal on U.S. Force Realignment in Japan.” It is a curious piece to say the least. Responding to the three senators’ (Webb, McCain, and Levin) claim that the current Roadmap for Futenma Relocation is “unrealistic, unworkable and unaffordable,” the article essentially rests on the counterargument that “it is unclear how their [the senators] proposal is more realistic/workable/affordable [than the current plan].” The article’s final sentence is “Had the senators thought their proposal through, they would have seen that theirs is an alternative that is unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable [italics in the original].”
The first question that comes to mind that one would want to ask is in response to this kind of statement is ”so you are admitting that the plan is indeed “unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable?” Fantastic – we now have two unrealistic, unworkable, and unaffordable plans. Surely the suggestion is not to go with the current unimplementable plan simply because it is the “official” one?
In reality, the point should be that because of current dynamics in American politics, the overall orientation of US forces overseas is going to need to be rethought by the government, because simply put, it is going to be forced upon them one way or another. I believe Peter Ennis is correct, or I hope he is, when he says that a new global force posture review will need to be undertaken. Surely a sensible option for the administration and foreign policy and military officials is to get out ahead of the running rather than be dragged along after by Congress. Ultimately, Dr. Hornung’s piece is most useful in demonstrating just exactly what the inherent practical problems are with evolving the Marine footprint on Okinawa. And this should be seen as an opportunity. As Ennis himself has commented many times before, the alliance is not in such bad health and could be in very good health if a broader, strategic rather than tactical and operational focus, is applied to the alliance, and security in East Asia in general.
But moving along, the article also contains this curious paragraph:
The current estimated cost for the Roadmap is $10 billion. Japan is paying over $6 billion of this. It is not up to the senators to decide what is affordable for Japan. It is brazen to think otherwise, especially when the United States borrows so heavily. Recovery from the March 11 disasters will be costly. Estimates reach as high as $300 billion, but this “enormous burden” does not mean Tokyo cannot afford realignment. For a $5 trillion economy, $300 billion of reconstruction is only 6 percent. While 6 percent is twice as large as the recovery after the 1995 Kobe earthquake, it is not unaffordable. Japan spends around 6 percent of its budget on public works. Because reconstruction will involve significant public works projects, a considerable amount of this money can be allocated from existing funds. Budgets throughout Tokyo will be tightened, but countries can multi-spend, even in the face of overwhelming difficulties. Tokyo’s continued support indicates it still believes the current agreement is affordable
I think there are two points here worthy of correction. One, I am reasonably sure the senators were referring to the cost for the US taxpayer, not the Japanese one. Two, more seriously, how is it less brazen to assume that because Japan already has a massive public debt and has to take on more debt because of triple disaster, that it is perfectly reasonable for a foreign government to expect it take on even more debt? Because, well, it is already in debt and getting more in debt, and thus debt must not be a problem, and hey, we have a pre-existing agreement? Because officials in the MOFA, MOD and PMO, not known for spending restraint in Japan, agreed to it and rushed the agreement through cabinet right before a new government came to power to intentionally make it difficult for them to revisit it? Because a Japanese politician, not particularly renown for political courage and clear headed thinking was cowed into (re)agreeing to the plan as he was driven out of the PMs office? Because the current PM, who is well known to not be particularly interested in foreign policy and strategic issues, learned a lesson from this and decided to not let the problem hurt his already severely weakened position? In all fairness, Dr. Hornung is likely correct that in some way or form Japan can afford this at a stretch, but I would like to point out that accusations of brazenness should be tempered somewhat.
The piece also laments the “unnecessary confusion” that both Hatoyama and the Senators have injected into the process, again resurrecting the extremely dubious idea that before Hatoyama and Messrs. McCain, Webb and Levin, everything was somehow fine. It states:
One official from the [Japanese] PMO [Prime Ministers Office] frankly stated that he was tired of academics and politicians becoming interested in Futenma and swooping in to offer alternatives, failing to realize their “alternatives” have already been examined, reexamined, and discarded.
And for extra points:
What is worrisome to Japanese officials is the fact that the senators hold powerful positions. Levin and McCain are the highest-ranking members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Webb is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee for East Asia and the Pacific. Officials understand that implementation is stalled because Tokyo still has to convince Nakaima to sign off on the land reclamation. Yet, they are worried that the senators could use their positions to effectively hold funding for the plan hostage in Congress…[the] three senators have single-handedly made Japanese officials worry about the United States fulfilling its commitment, thereby giving them reduced incentive to spend the necessary political capital to push through any deal with Nakaima.
I’m sure many people are worried. And I am sure groups in the bureaucratic establishment of both countries do indeed find democratic oversight and conscientious debate very troublesome. As bureaucracies the world over, democratic or otherwise, are wont to do. But that is hardly the point. Nakaima is/was never going to sign, nor will his successor. The electoral dynamics would never allow it at the prefectural level, and a forced solution would be extraordinarily foolish at the national level. And they will not be able to “convince local groups of the reasons why Marines need to stay in Okinawa.”
The Roadmap is not a perfect option, but it is the best option to meet the operational needs of the Marines and reduce the U.S. footprint on Okinawa.
Ultimately this is the problem. We are dealing with two democratic countries, where government oversight of bureaucratic decisions, and popular oversight of government decisions are norms that, somewhat inconveniently it would seem, the natives have internalized. Is it not ultimately up to the Okinawans to decide what constitutes a reduced footprint on Okinawa? After all, this is not just about noise and accidents. There is a history of unwanted military dominance in Okinawa, and a perception of dual colonialism to consider, a SOFA that some believe is unfair, and contradictions abound that would not be tolerated if Okinawa was one of the mainland Japanese prefectures. It is just a shame that it had to be the US Senate that exercised political oversight on behalf of Okinawan, as well as American citizens.
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Corey Wallace joined Japan Security Watch in 2011. He writes on Japan security-related topics, focusing on issues and stories that may not find their way into the English language media. He also hosts the blog Sigma1 where he writes on Japanese domestic politics and broader issues in international relations.
Prior to taking up a PhD Corey was a participant on the JET program (2004-2007) and on returning to New Zealand he worked at the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology from 2007-2010 as a policy adviser. Corey lectures two courses at the University of Auckland. One is on the international relations of the Asia-Pacific, which contains a significant focus on East Asia security issues. The other is a course on China's international relations.
His primary academic interests before his current Japan focus were science and technology politics/policy, issues of ethnic identity, and Chinese modern history and politics. He carries over his interest in issues of identity and history into his PhD where he is looking at generationally situated concepts of national identity and their impact on foreign policy ideas in Japan.
Corey Wallace has 256 post(s) on Japan Security Watch
15 comments
Kyle Mizokami says:
Jun 21, 2011
Hornung's is exactly the sort of analysis by many Americans on this issue that I've been thinking about lately. Heavy on the "what's in it for the American military", very little to nothing on "what's in it for Japanese civilians".
Oh, but wait, Governor Nakaima opposes intergration of Futenma and Kadena! And the hardship integration would cause Kadena's neighbors! See, he's thinking about Japanese civilians after all!
Also, maybe I'm a little naive, but I find it hard to believe that a Kadena with a reduced USAF fixed-wing presence plus the USMC helicopters of Futenma would just be, frankly, too hard. Really? That sort of thing is just too hard? When Kadena is already operating both helicopters and fixed-wing?
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Corey Wallace says:
Jun 21, 2011
Yes, a good point Kyle, it is somewhat interesting that Okinawan hardship is recognized this time!
Also, you would know more than me about the logistics so I try not to second guess these "experts" on these aspects but there seems to be enough dissent from the view that Kadena cannot handle the extra burden for me to not necessarily take everything on face value. Also I am inherently suspicious when bureaucracies are looking over the plans that will have consequences for their own influence- having worked in government and bureaucracy I know exactly how hard it for an organization to say "no, we are not really adding any additional value by being in this space."
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Duelling Perspectives « σ1 says:
Jun 21, 2011
[...] the issue really is with force realignment. I have provided a response at JSW to the CSIS article here. The originals are here for Peter Ennis, and here for [...]
mbneville says:
Jun 22, 2011
"Is it not ultimately up to the Okinawans to decide what constitutes a reduced footprint on Okinawa?"
If it were ultimately up to Okinawans, all the bases would be removed. By Okinawans I mean local politicians and bureaucrats. One of the main problems with the Futenma base issue and the entire political climate in Okinawa is how radicalized politics have become on the island. People that don't live in Okinawa or have knowledge about how local politics have developed over the past few decades don't get this, and it shows in articles like this.
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mbneville says:
Jun 22, 2011
"And they will not be able to “convince local groups of the reasons why Marines need to stay in Okinawa."
This may be true, but the fact is they haven't even tried.
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Corey Wallace says:
Jun 22, 2011
mbneville – many thanks for your comments. It certainly is very odd, almost confusing that the political situation on the ground is ignored so easily. If if the US simply didn't want to deal with the issue, which as you point out, they haven't really tried, I am not sure how they expect the Japanese government to magically deal with the same issue…unless of course they are expecting the Japanese government to bulldoze the plan through, likely physically as well as politically.
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Robert says:
Jun 22, 2011
This is an indicator of the seriousness of the treaty disease that has infected both sides(Japan+U.S.) from the Treaty of Perpetual Dependence.The U.S. will not yield because they haven't had to for 70 odd years, the Japanese leadership will not stand up for their own citizens because they haven't been allowed to and haven't demanded it for 70 odd years.The U.S. cares about only one thing in Japan and that is Japanese territory, if the Japanese would realize this then they would realize that they hold the trump,not the U.S.
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Corey Wallace says:
Jun 22, 2011
Robert, there is certainly something to be said for Japan, or Japanese bureaucrats if they went beyond their own self-interest, having a stronger hand than they believe they do.
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mbneville says:
Jun 22, 2011
It is up to the Japanese government to fix local political roadblocks, not the US military. The problem is that Okinawa politics have gone very hard to the left end of the political spectrum and become very anti-base, anti-military. This is a result of years and years of relentless anti-base propaganda through the education system, public employee unions, as well as through the two newspapers Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times. The Ryukyu Times have publicly admitted they have an anti-base agenda, and if you talk to any local reporter they will tell you the local TV stations also report with an anti-base stance. So, for years the pro-base side has not been heard. Each side has arguments for or against the bases, but only one side is given attention. Since the epic Hatoyama failure and the big protest afterwards, Gov. Nakaima is in no position politically to sign off on the bases. It would be suicide for him. However, Nakaima used to be much more pro-base before all this mess started.
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mbneville says:
Jun 22, 2011
One thing to keep in mind about Okinawan politics is that the anti-base side uses all kinds of arguments like a new base will destroy the environment, the bases are too loud, military personnel are terrible people that rape and terrorize the locals, Okinawa has too much of a 'burden', etc., but most of these arguments are false premises or greatly exaggerated. The real difference is a philosophical one. The anti-base side simply thinks bases and military forces are unnecessary in the modern world. They believe disarmament and pacifism along with peace talks and treaties will create world peace. They will not give up until Okinawa is completely base free. This is what the 'Peace education' curriculum is all about in the schools in Okinawa. So really, if the Japanese govt wants to continue to have the US military take care of its security, the base issue needs to be fought at a more fundamental philosophical level than simply responding to the premises laid out by the anti-base side.
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Corey Wallace says:
Jun 22, 2011
Absolutely anti-base sentiment is reproduced in the media and is generally as you say quite explicit, and certainly there are pro-base contingencies in Okinawa as well that are given much less attention. Your point about it having to go beyond just reassuring people about some noise is absolutely correct. But I would want to add something more to that point – that is to say that these things don't come out of pure thin air and are not complete artificial constructs – as mentioned in my post above there is a strong historical dimension and perception of dual colonialism at play here, that has impacted upon Okinawan identity, and there current issues about the political relationship between the mainland and the islands that make these tensions all the more poignant. I suspect the anti-base movement gets support from various groups who may see the anti-base movement as symbolizing something more than a steadfast commitment to pacifism.
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mbneville says:
Jun 22, 2011
It is very hard to say how much a perception of colonialism has to do with anti-base sentiment in Okinawa. My opinion is that this sentiment is stronger among intellectuals and academics writing and talking about the base issue than the actual Okinawan people themselves. Most Okinawans are not going about their daily lives thinking that the Americans are colonial oppressors. They are also not sitting down thinking about the long history of foreign occupation. Most people's historical perspective starts the day they were born.
Contrary to how things are portrayed in the media, relations between the military and Okinawans are not that bad. Yes there are problems with the bases that are not made out of thin air. There are crimes and noise, but if things were really so terrible there would not be so many people living right next to the bases. I know people that have voluntarily moved next to Kadena. There are ways to combat noise. A lot of the evidence and arguments the anti-base side uses is simply incorrect, unproven, or misleading. Some things that are believed about the bases are demonstrably true, but other things are believed simply because they have been asserted over and over again.
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Corey Wallace says:
Jun 22, 2011
"Most Okinawans are not going about their daily lives thinking that the Americans are colonial oppressors. They are also not sitting down thinking about the long history of foreign occupation. Most people’s historical perspective starts the day they were born.
Contrary to how things are portrayed in the media, relations between the military and Okinawans are not that bad."
This could well be true and I take your word for it as it seems likely – indeed most people the world over don't tend to sit around all day discussing history, politics and colonialism, even in the countries where this would be expected. But symbolic politics, and for that matter nationalism, is a funny thing and it need not be always entirely connected to or even coherent with the actual direct experiences of one's life. As a purely anecdotal example, I have one good Japanese friend who speaks and reads Chinese very well, has many Chinese friends and converses with them, wants to work in a Chinese company etc etc. Same goes for English and his relationship with the Western world. He is also very smart and thoughtful. Yet, he will not hesitate to participate in an anti-Chinese rally or a demonstration against local voting rights for permanent residents etc. Seems that there is both conscious and sub-conscious elements to this. I do find it a little hard to believe that the anti-base movement has little to do with Okinawan identity, in the many various and variant forms it takes. But anyhow, I take your point(s) and don't outright disagree with anything you have written. I have not spent long enough in Okinawa to claim to be an expert on it and you certainly seem to have a better understanding of the issues than I. Imperfect and complex as the situation might be however, it seems inescapable to me that the Okinawan voice will have to be heard on this issue at the very least, and I imagine you probably don't disagree.
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Robert says:
Jun 23, 2011
The U.S. refuses to acknowlege that the majorityof Japanese citizens on the Japanese island of Okinawa do not want them there(for whatever reason or motivation)that should be enough for a "true friend and our strongest ally in the Pacific" but I keep pointing out that this is an excellent opportunity for the U.S. to accomplish so many things by removing all the Marines that they have said they want. A few would be to make the Japanese citizens on the Japanese island of Okinawa less hostile to the bases that will remain,it would force the Japanese leadership to make some serious commitments to their own defense(a marine corps of their own), we could cut some costs,it might nudge the Japanese closer to amending that adbomination they call a constitution(and my biggest concern has always been what are we going to do with an ally who can't help us substantially when China really starts flexing.
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Corey Wallace says:
Jul 26, 2011
Many thanks for your comment and encouragement! I am with you on Dr Hornung – his article about "disaster nationalism" was not much better and really only shows concern or an interest in the US' own interests – which is fine and well, but it seems to me to suggest that somehow it would only be natural for the Japanese to submit to this view of the world because that is the only way Japan can be safe, and so let's not worry about annoying issues like political reform and social change!
Anyway, please feel free to comment any time.
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