SDF welcomed by children in Tohoku (Source: via Ichiro Kojima)
Just came across Andrew Levidis’ pondering on the tired (but still relevant) theme of Japan at the crossroads:
[...] For just as Yamagata Aritomo and his protégés interpreted the era during and after the First World War as an ‘opportunity’ the triple disaster might similarly provide the impetus for a new definition of Japanese purpose. Such a purpose rests on the construction of a robust and flexible legislative framework for national security that replaces the artifice and evasions which characterised Yoshida and his successor’s post-war choices.
Concretely it entails the reinterpretation of the meaning of ‘war potential’ and revision of the Japanese Cabinet Legislation Bureau’s interpretation banning collective security, to permit the SDF to engage in collective action alongside the United States and its regional allies. This would permit Japan to deploy a ‘full spectrum’ military force configured toward a robust expeditionary and asymmetric capability and emphasising the expansion of special forces, intelligence and drone capabilities, the acquisition of fifth generation stealth fighters, and greater power projection platforms central to sustaining out of area operations. Such operational capabilities would provide Japan with the strategic option to respond rapidly to regional contingencies on the Korean peninsula or further afield to provide disaster relief in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. It would provide Japan with the capability to assist ASEAN states if threatened and to forge deeper and more expansive security partnerships with Australia, India and South Korea. And it would finally replace Japan’s postwar ambivalence and artifice with an active commitment to regional security and prosperity.
Read the full article over at East Asia Forum.
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A former contributor to World Intelligence (Japan Military Review), James Simpson joined Japan Security Watch in 2011, migrating with his blog Defending Japan. He has a Masters in Security Studies from Aberystwyth University and is currently living in Kawasaki, Japan.
His primary interests include the so-called 'normalization' of Japanese security (i.e. militarization), and the political impact of the abduction issue with North Korea.
James Simpson has 254 post(s) on Japan Security Watch
36 comments
Corey Wallace says:
May 29, 2011
Great article. Always refreshing to read someone understands Japan's security policy evolution, historically speaking as well as current. Much of what he refers to has been happening for some time, but certainly the triple disaster could help in the acceleration of the process.
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James Simpson says:
May 29, 2011
Absolutely, given the more open presence of the SDF during this time, the 'bonds' being made (to quote an earlier Sankei article), and the lack of complete and utter failures on their behalf (unlike say the dispatch problems of the Hanshin Earthquake), they have a lot of goodwill to work with. There is probably no better time to be a jieitai socially, although it is a shame that it has come with so much psychological and physical cost too.
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 29, 2011
I'm glad you guys liked the article.
You guys are right that much has been said about Japanese security evolution but the historical dimension of the struggle is I think rarely examined in-depth. When it is much of it is the all too familiar recitation of the post-Cold War strategic tumult in Japan's security environment, the rise of China, North Korea etc…. What is lacking it seems is the historical, intellectual and political dimension to the course of security evolution. I think what remains relatively unexamined is how th reactivity and rigidity afflicting the SDF liess in the nature of the evasions and struggles of those early postwar years and hence at the heart of the purpose of the postwar armed forces. It seems inescapably tied to Yoshida and KIshi's struggle over the sources and causes of national power in international politics and the role of the SDF in Japan's postwar diplomatic strategy.
The key question is whether the SDF can summon the will to move opportunistically and with pragmatism to utilize the goodwill generated by the crisis to push forward with an expansive agenda? Legislative change remains unlikely in the present Diet rather I think what we are seeing is the SDF maneuvering cautiously to consolidate bureaucratic and political support to accelerate current trends until the legislative framework meets, even if uneasily, the operational reality of Japan's present and future capabilities.
I really appreciate the work you guys are doing here on Japanese defense policy and security evolution, and I would love to get involved help out if possible, so please feel free to email me anytime.
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Corey Wallace says:
May 29, 2011
Hi Andrew, thanks for coming by and leaving the comment! I absolutely agree that the historically dimension is not sufficiently given its due credit in explanations of Japan's security evolution – or when it is, it is usually one that doesn't reflect the social discourses that shaped Japan's foreign policy over time. I would be interested to learn more, especially in regards to the Yoshida-Kishi dynamic that you mention, as while I have read a bit on this period, I feel there is so much that can and should be told given that many scholars treat that era as a black box of little interest to modern Japanese politics and foreign policy. I approve of the Richard Samuels' citation, therefore.
I fully agree with your description of the current context the SDF, and to that end, the MoD is working within in terms of the political terrain.
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Gray says:
May 29, 2011
When you say that power projection capability would give Japan the option "to provide disaster relief in Southeast Asia and the Middle East" you're engaging in unnecessary obfuscation of what this means in realist terms. Certainly, Japan would have the option to use the cloak of 'humanitarian relief' to intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign states but stealth fighters and drones have absolutely no bearing on such operations, while the 2005 Indonesia task force, which served as a dry run for joint operations command, showed Japan to be perfectly capable of humanitarian activities as is.
By "robust" and "asymmetric" capabilities I'm forced to interpret this as an offensive strike capability capable of overwhelming numerically superior but vastly technologically inferior, third world or developing nations. Something that in no way plays to Japan's security needs. With present budgetary constraints the idea that deploying strike capabilities thousands of miles from Japan's home territories would be a reasonable alternative to bolstering local blue and white water naval power is eminently unjustifiable and plays purely to what America (and her coterie) might wish for.
Additionally, by highlighting Japan's "ambivalence and artifice" you seem to be adhering to the typical US DoD/SD admmonition to "get off the bleachers and onto the playing field". You refer to "artifice" again, specifically in regard to Yoshida without providing any clarification of where you see this to have been the case. His policy for a "lightly armed mercantile state" was a quite open trade off between the demands of the US and Japan's own disparate factions and was hugely successful in achieving its aims.
Again, when you speak of Japan acting with "boldness" to rebalance the security order of East Asia it would appear that you mean this to be the re-establishment of clear American dominance of the region, a path that may or may not coincide with Japan's self-interest but is certainly not automatically the one and true route to regional security.
Finally (though there are a few other minor points I would quibble such as your conflation of comprehensive and military security), framing post-Cold War security evolution as a reaction to Chinese rather than North Korea threat is utterly off the mark. The abduction issue, missile tests and nuclear weapons program were vastly more influential on security strategy during the 1990's and early 2000's than Chinese military growth. China only equaled Japan's spending levels quite recently (2007 by their terms, between 2001 and 2005 by more accurate assessment) something that in itself still means very little when balanced against the full-array of China's potential enemies and its internal needs for the lion's share of military attention. Once again the China threat is primarily naval/marine in nature and not something that requires (or is being assigned) surgical strike capability.
In short your article would appear to be urging Japan to ape the military posture of its current allies without regard to the specific Japanese security needs, capabilities and geostrategic-restrictions, that make such a path both unnecessary and highly likely to be counter-productive to Japan's long-term security. And this from an advocate of constitutional revision, greater Japanese military independence and more forceful foreign policy.
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 30, 2011
You present an interesting analysis of my article in the EAF and I would like to respond substantively and respectfully to this critique.
What is the fastest route to security normalization given the reduced material, political and psychological that Japanese planners are confronting in the immediate region and beyond? The answer is central to answering your critique. To argue that power projection capability gives Japan the option to provide disaster relief in Southeast Asia and the Middle East is “unnecessary obfuscation” misunderstands the subtleties and nuance of the framework necessary to reconstitute Japan’s military strength. What you seem to have failed to discern is that the artifice which accompanies the maneuver serves necessarily the dual purpose of reassuring the Japanese public and simultaneously its neighbors in East Asia as to the ultimate purpose of Japanese power. Too open an avowal of the purpose of national power is inelegant and in its impatience with the intangibles of international politics threatens risks everything on the single move. The true test of a states policy and its purpose in international politics rests not so much on an open avowal of its purpose but on the manner in which it is achieved and on the principle in the name o which it seeks to act.
The principles of Japanese security must be capable of transforming incoherence into a formidable strategic doctrine whilst preserving the appearance of repose. It must attempt the necessarily difficult reconciliation of domestic legitimation with the general legitimacy of the international system. Japan must preserve the appearance of rest amidst absolute motion in order to actively keep all its security options open. The “unnecessary obfuscation” that you see might better be understood as the curtain which conceals an intricate interplay of national interest where success lies in obscuring the true purpose until the constellation of interests shift to permit the changes. It is in many ways a contest of endurance on the part of Japanese political leaders and strategists who must seek success in a unsatisfying contest of pinpricks rather than in the fait de compli. For security normalization requires the pragmatic utilization and deployment of a framework flexible enough to encompass a diversity of purposes whilst remaining rigorous enough to provide the necessary political legitimation to alter the nature of the postwar security strategy.
The “cloak of humanitarian relief” to “intervene in domestic affairs of foreign states” is a rather mean and rigid interpretation of the exercise of Japanese national interest whether regionally or further afield in Central Asia or the Middle East. Disaster Relief is ultimately an expansive concept which allows a flexible and discriminate response by Japan towards both natural disaster and humanitarian disasters. In these conflicts we have seen more and more a inexorable turn to the deployment of drone capabilities in order to maintain supremacy in the battlefield, reduce the necessity of a large local footprint and provide strategic options in a wide variety of possible scenarios. To argue that Japan’s action in the response to the 2005 tsunami disaster did not reveal significant and sustained operational weaknesses in the SDF command and control capabiltieis and its ability to maintain the tempo of sustained operations is quite misleading and ignores the SDF’s own evaluation of its performance.
Robust and asymmetric capabilities refer to a commitment by Japan to maintain a quantifiable and qualitative technological superiority regionally and whose possession would provides Japan with the strategic option to take part in security operations alongside the United States regionally and globally. Concretely it means the possession of capabilities which allow Japan to react to nontraditional security threats at different levels along the spectrum of threat i.e. from terrorist threats in Southeast and Central Asia to the current nuclear crisis. To infer that it refers simply to offensive strike capabilities is a rather rigid and narrow definition.
The “ambivalence and artifice” I refer to in this is not the DOD/SD admonition rather it refers to the nature of the strategic choices that Yoshida and his successors chose to cloak the postwar armed forces in during the early postwar era. Yoshida’s strategy was aimed at dealing the reconstitution of the postwar military until Japan could regenerate its economic power and consolidate it military. Yet the pragmatic choices Yoshida made which were tied to a specific time and moment in Japanese history became institutionalized by his successors. To be sure, while Yoshida was prime minister these dilemmas and omissions could be obscured by his diplomatic skill. When the brilliance of Yoshida’s diplomatic strategy was past to the stewardship of lesser men, who lacked Yoshida’s sure touch and sensitivity to the ebbs and flows of power, the result would be decades of strategic sterility. Their failure points to an incontrovertible reality: that Yoshida’s conception, whilst legitimated and maintained as Japan’s post-war grand strategy was in the end a highly ambiguous affair that has left Japan with a strategic deficit and an inability, and unwillingness, to confront post-war tensions. Those political leaders who styled themselves as Yoshida’s disciples or heirs had misunderstood the maxims that had made his strategy possible in the first place. The system they crafted in its own way succeeded in the limited goals it had been set: economic growth, modernization and the avoidance of responsibility. But it was such a banal and demeaning strategy for a proud state that it could not but have far reaching affects on Japan’s ability to conceive of new alternatives to its strategic course.
Next, whilst the North Korean threat poses most forcefully the new threat environment which has stimulated Japanese security normalization the reality is that North Korea was used opportunistically by Japanese security planners to push for changes which otherwise might have proven difficult on their own merits. Secondly I think you conflate the domestic reaction to the abduction issue, missile tests and nuclear weapons with the long term strategic problems which necessarily occupy many in the Japanese defense establishment. I don’t know the exact numbers you are using to compare PRC and Japan defense expenditure but I feel that you drastically underestimate the true extent of China’s military modernization. China is not simply a naval or maritime threat to Japan: It presents a multidimensional threat to Japanese interests regionally and globally. Since the 1990s China has deployed an increasingly sophisticated “anti-access” capability to limit the ability of the United States and Japan in the event of a regional confrontation. At the same time it has intensified its claims to the South China Sea, codified into law its right to attack Taiwan, and adopted an increasingly assertive position towards U.S. allies in the region, specifically Japan. North Korea has always been a sideshow, China presents most forcefully the strategic questions facing Japan now and into the future.
How would replacing Japan’s aversion to regional security with a new willingness to act in defense of the equilibrium and balance in the region be “counter-productive” to Japan’s long-term security? And to deny that the U.S. and Japan share strategic interests in the maintenance and revitalization of the postwar security system in East Asia reflects not a realist or pragmatic understanding of international politics but a necessarily incomplete understanding of the true dimensions of Japanese national interests and it labors under the weight of its own pathologies. For it reflects simply the more narrow and ultimately unsatisfying narrow definition of Japanese interest associated with mid-twentieth century Japanese conservatism stripped of all its nuance and richness. It is not realism for it knows neither the odd note of reticence nor the ability to adjust its wisdom to the cool calculation of nation interest and power.
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Gray says:
May 30, 2011
"The principles of Japanese security must be capable of transforming incoherence into a formidable strategic doctrine whilst preserving the appearance of repose."
I can't imagine that you are suggesting Japan might deceive anyone, least of all China, with such a transparent policy. Even the most likely group to accept media spin at face value, the Japanese public, are prone to minute examination of the smallest change in the role of the armed forces and, while they might not match China for guile, the idea that they (or neighboring East Asian states) could be manipulated into acceptance of Japan's aggressive use of lethal force under any aegis bar direct self-defense is irreconcilable with current reality.
You then refer to disaster relief operations and immediately after to "In these conflicts we have seen more and more a inexorable turn to the deployment of drone capabilities in order to maintain supremacy in the battlefield" which is confusing for me. Is there something missing there that should link humanitarian relief and drone attacks?
In any event, your criticism of the JSDF operations in Aceh appears to be based upon sources I have not seen. Given that it was the largest Japanese military operation in the post-war era, the first use of a rudimentary Joint Command structure and the first case of the JSDF conducting joint operations with the JDR, there were invariably bound to be areas in which improvements could be made but none that I would class as "significant" operational weaknesses, decidedly not in regards to a new command structure being given its first dry-run.
Your clarification of your take on "robust and asymmetric" capabilities is appreciated but asymmetric in a military context does not generally refer to disaster relief operations. Even so, to suggest that an option exists whereby Japan can sign up for an all-encompassing package of security counter-measures (from terrorist threats……to the current nuclear crisis) is entirely unrealistic and unnecessary. Japan has displayed a solid ability to learn from disasters and had already established the Central Readiness Force with NBC specialists. In the wake of the Tohuku disaster they will be seriously overhauled while the only serious threat of terrorism for Japan would only come about as a result of participation in exactly the sort of imperial adventurism you advocate.
And at the same time that you recommend far flung 'interventions' you also highlight China, Japan's very doorstep, as the key "multidimensional threat" to Japan's future. Apart from the fact that China is a vital trading partner and food source for Japan the most recent rise of the "China threat" only began around 2003-5 during the US push to use the opportunities of the war on terror to contain the growing powerhouse. Prior to that relations had been significantly warmer and in the period after, under both Fukuma and Hatoyama they warmed once again. What the future holds is something neither of us can say and even Richard Samuel has been quick to admit that the US alliance can, in its own way, pose as serious a threat to Japanese security as any of its neighbors.
You then commend Yoshida for instigating a policy of hidden military regrowth and castigate his successors. Strange to me, given that most sources I'm aware of regard the 'Yoshida doctrine' as a simple compromise between diametrically opposed factions, rather than a brilliant long term strategy or even the work of a single man. It was in fact, one of his successors, Ikeda Hayato, who, acting as Minister of Finance under Yoshida, made the initial proposition to trade basing rights for protection. It was also as a result of Yoshida's compromise that the staunchly anti-military MoF won acceptance of a policy of minimum necessary defense’and a clause in the 1953 Arms Production Law that hobbled Japanese defense production. The only ray of light, and the key to Japan's economic recovery, was the clause inserted into the 1954 Mutual Security Assistance Agreement that allowed for the import of defense related technology. During what you call "decades of strategic sterility" the fruit of that one clause revitalized the entire Japanese civilian industrial sector under the stewardship of leaders whose worth you seem to entirely overlook.
Leaving aside the evident success of this "banal and demeaning" strategy you are completely unjustified in your casual dismissal of North Korea's impact. From 1992 through to the mid-2000s it was the defining threat to the Japanese nation driving the cornerstone military system of the period (BMD) and, while the abduction issue was certainly used a political touchstone, I'm not sure how it is possible to conflate the domestic reaction to these issues with long-term strategic problems. They are patently entirely different issues and the latter in now way relates to the perfectly clear influence missile and nuclear testing had on Japanese military planning and repeated pressure from within the defense establishment for development of countermeasures specific to those threats.
When you speak of a "willingness to act in defense of the equilibrium and balance in the region" you are once again stating a wish for Japan to bolster US influence, which is explicitly not the same thing as balance and equilibrium. That the previous status quo had overwhelmingly favored US interest does not equate to "balance" and even if it had, that time is past. For better or worse, China's newfound strength has upset that apple cart and urging Japan to strap on its guns and start swaggering is not what I would consider bringing balance or security to the region.
When you start to speak of "the more narrow and ultimately unsatisfying narrow definition of Japanese interest associated with mid-twentieth century Japanese conservatism stripped of all its nuance and richness" you once again lose me. I assume you are referring once again to Yoshida and his "banal and demeaning" policies but what they have to do with present day Japan is beyond me. Is this a new version of Godwin's Law whereby anyone you disagree with is compared to 1950's Prime Minister's regardless of what they are actually saying?
The only thing that Japan strategic planners can be assured of is that the US and China both operate on ruthlessly pragmatic levels of realpolitik and that either nation would throw Japan under the bus should self-interest call for it. Japan's challenge in the coming century is not to simply ape the United State or blindly heed its master's every beck and call but to make the difficult choice of whether to operate internationally with some sincere adherence to international law and human rights or to follow in the former pairs example and play the same game of cut-throat, high stakes poker. In the former case Japan must accept that its internationally position will inevitably wane (though its reputation, and security, may increase). In the latter instance Japan's need to prevent chaos in its home territory requires it to balance the interests of each of its regional trading-partners. Something that will not be enhanced by the path you suggest, a policy that would rob the JSDF of very limited resources needed to address much closer security threats, bring significant harm to Japan's international reputation, alienate the very countries whose favor she most needs to court and invite reprisals of extreme violence for no gain that could not be won through more subtle and far less aggressive means.
I do appreciate your post but I believe you have approached the issue with a prior bias as to where Japan's interest 'inevitably' lies.
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Corey Wallace says:
May 30, 2011
Gray, I will let Andrew respond to the specifics here, but there is more than a few touches of irony in your post.
"Is this a new version of Godwin’s Law whereby anyone you disagree with is compared to 1950′s Prime Minister’s regardless of what they are actually saying?"
Beautiful irony here. And your gross oversimplification of other people's arguments is not a similar strategy? Trying to pin the rest of us to being blind followers of the evil empire of the US is not such a strategy?
To accuse us of being DoD acolytes is both absurd and offensive. If we are not with you, we are against you? You have some good points that given a more appropriate approach would lend themselves to a good discussion – and I would suspect some of those like myself who are more sceptical towards US designs for Japan would agree. But the degree of certitude you take to what are actually complex issues, and how quickly you dismiss the view of others through force of word and/or the use of strawmen, goes beyond what the evidence allows.
"you have approached the issue with a prior bias as to where Japan’s interest ‘inevitably’ lies."
From my point of view at least, "normal" is whatever Japan wants it to be and not just a simple aping of US "realist" thought. This is in contrast with your view which seems to point to anything that aligns with US interest being nothing more than an extension of US power by Japan.
Frankly,most of us do not have such a bias – a careful and faithful engagement with Andrew, my and James' ideas would show that we are not actually concerned so much with what the outcome should be in a normative sense but more with the fact that socio-political dynamics have influenced the evolution of Japan's security policy over time. I can tell, including from previous comments, that you have a very specific and technical understanding of this evolution which is certainly important. But it ignores conceptualizations of identity and nation in Japan, and how they evolved over time. It seems devoid of cultural content and an understanding of the dynamics of contingency and flux.
We appreciate your knowledge and you clearly know much and have a specific view of what Japan should do, and that is fine. But as one of the caretakers of this site I think you need to take better care to characterize other people's arguments appropriately. More so, given that you seem to have a very specific view why don't you share that from time to time, and we can discuss sincerely?That is instead of simply being, like you claim Japanese foreign policy to be, "reactive."
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Gray says:
May 30, 2011
You seem to have taken some personal offense at my posting style which was not my intent. At the same time unless you have specific example of where I was attacking a person rather than their specific argument or point of view I feel that I have nothing to apologize for. My comments are often critical, at times harsh and far less rarely, and only where I feel it has been justified, sarcastic. I try as much as possible to restrict such views to the narrow areas being discussed rather than any wider comment on the views or personality of people involved but, nonetheless, believe that a strong, even heated, discussion of issues is the best way not simply to highlight the flaws in others thinking but to uncover the errors and weaknesses in my own. As the latter is far more valuable to my development than the former I'm always quite willing to admit faults in my reasoning or error sin my base assumptions and such instances often do more for my understanding of issues than countless hours of independent study.
As far as your specific complaints, I don't believe I have oversimplified Andrew's argument and if I have inadvertently done so it is through my own failure to understand its depth rather than malicious intent, in which case I would be more than happy to examine it in a more nuanced fashion.
I also fail to see any comments where I labeled everyone involved in JSW as DoD acolytes (as opposed to saying that a specific strategic recommendation voiced in this article was in line with frequent DoD comments on Japan's military failure to commit). Furthermore, as my previous post explicitly states my own view is that Japanese strategy should be based upon maximizing its relationship with both the US and China which is clearly not at all in line with your statement that I view "anything that aligns with US interest being nothing more than an extension of US power by Japan." Rather it would, on the face of things, seem to match the position you express above, making your strong reaction to my comments quite unexpected.
I'm also curious as to how my "specific and technical understanding" (which is far less specific and worse understood than I would desire) also "ignores conceptualizations of identity and nation" and "cultural content". Culture is a fluid dynamic that responds to diverse drivers and, while certainly no expert, I believe I have a reasonable layman's grasp of many of the dominant elements that have conditioned the national psyche, at least in the elite and geopolitical strategic dimensions, over the past 150 years. Perhaps you will say, any such knowledge has not been expressed above, to which I would answer the topic in question is not one in which such issues are a major factor and furthermore that rejecting the relevance of cultural forces in specific cases is not the same as rejecting their existence or relevance in other areas.
Again, I come here to learn. Facts and opinion from the articles. Errors in my own understanding of those things from the comments I post. If I simply wanted to broadcast my opinions I would not be engaging in a dialogue. Obviously such a dialogue needs to be within the bounds of polite discourse but if you want to have debate about the topics addressed there will be critical comments made and some people will likely not appreciate them, others will not care and some will accept them with thanks. In any event, I am more than happy to abide by the boundaries on discussion that you choose to set and simply request that you give me specific examples of anything that may cross the line.
Best wishes,
Gray
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Corey Wallace says:
May 30, 2011
Gray, many thanks for the response – duly noted and appreciated.
To be sure, perhaps they are not expressly personal in a literal sense, but the two quotes I identified in the previous comment border very closely to the point where it would be hard for someone not to take them as such. Also comments such as: result of participation in exactly the sort of imperial adventurism you advocate are not particularly helpful either. Andrew may be advocating a more proactive stance – and you may disagree with that stance for a variety of reasons – but I struggled to see how it could be equated with him supporting imperial adventurism.
And here is where it is interesting – my previous post explicitly states my own view is that Japanese strategy should be based upon maximizing its relationship with both the US and China – I could not come up with a better starting point to describe my own particularly view of Japan's foreign policy, which, as you point to also, makes this all a little unusual.
Perhaps the issue of communication here is that I am less inclined to think that Japan should or can disentangle itself so easily from the US without creating regional instability in the short-term. After all, look at the thanks Hatoyama and co. received from China for their more proactive engagement and willingness to stand up to the US for even a moment on the Futenma issue. Lesson learnt – maybe the wrong one but the damage was done.
The other issue is, as China is learning, building an independent defense capability is not as simple as buying and making hardware but also involves implementing systems of communication and coordination, having experience with logistics and ultimately just having a proper plan that supports inter-service integration etc etc.
In this sense it makes sense for Japan to continue the juggling act of embracing the US when needed, keeping it arms length at other times, and not releasing until it can indeed stand on its own feet, whether it be through a true commitment to an autonomous defense, a principled adherence to a UN-centred foreign/security policy, something else, or something in between. In the mean-time hedging seems perfectly rational. If I was to criticize anything right now, it would not be that they are hedging at all but that one part of the hedge, the China part, has lost a bit of focus since 2010 for obvious reasons.
I also see Japan's increasing proactive stance as part of a process of ally and alliance diversification, which is something quite new – Japan tended not to look at engaging countries other than the US in direct military interactions until recently for fear of what the US might think, especially during the Cold War period. But again, it is being pursued in a fashion that does not suggest the intention to reject the US. It could be pointed out that Korea, India, Vietnam, Australia, Philippines, even the EU etc are all US allies – but all of these countries also have contemporary and historical reservations about both a Chinese as well as US dominated world-order and this often comes out in domestic debates on foreign policy. It makes sense for Japan to find avenues to facilitate engagement, including military, with these countries. Unlike US strategy however, I believe Japan will try and package these military engagements in the context of other aspects of diplomacy – international cooperation at the multilateral level, trade negotiations, other forms of bilateral engagement. Afterall, all of them have the US as a security partner, but also have, or will have, China as their most important economic partner, and thus all greatly desire to avoid being stuck between the US and China in some sort of cold war dynamic (although to be sure it can only really be a cold "argument" given the interdependencies cf. US-USSR). I believe that Japanese policymakers have appreciated all of this and are actually seeking to increase Japan's freedom of action, both in terms of capabilities as well as legally, should it want to use it, including independently of the US.
Inherit in all of this, therefore, are a number of complex relations that will need to be considered and I have less confidence it seems than yourself about the specific action that Japan should take given the complex regional security environment. But I do feel whatever it is, some "slack" needs to be built into the strategy so that Japan can both extend itself further if need be, or recalibrate and recline should that be required also. To that end I believe that Japan is in the process, if imperfectly, of evolving a foreign policy that will allow this while considering the regional environment as well as domestic and identity factors.
And for the most part the public supports a slow evolution of Japan's security policy that will allow greater flexibility while also observing the need for such a policy to at the very least not undermine Japan's own democratic health. In fact, I see the two processes as related – while Japan may well be in political chaos right now, I see it as part of the birth pains of a new type of democracy and a new type of relationship between the nation and the state being formed. Until now any strong move towards embracing militarism or supporting militarization in Japan was rejected mostly because of fears for Japan's evolving democracy more than antimilitarism as a concept separate from democracy. The 1960 protests against Kishi's actions in ramming through the Mutual Security Treaty were motivated more out of anger at the anti-democratic nature of the action than the action itself (after all at the time antimilitarism itself was not fully formed in Japan and institutionalized). However, Japan's democracy is more robust than ever and the importance of a robust democracy base is crucial for mitigating the anti-democratic impulses of the military that any democracy has to deal with. This is after all a lesson from Japan's own history that they are fully aware off, given how easily the fledgling Taisho democracy gave way to militarism in the 1930s. Many Westerners, tend to like to draw a straight line from Meiji nationalism and state-building to 1930s fascism, which feeds into the narrative of Japan's remilitarization and the fact that Japan is not a transparent nor democratic country, a favourite meme of the NY Times. But of course the real story is much more complex. Thus Japan's move towards a more proactive stance is not simply motivated out of a blind allegiance to the US, (although MOFA is one party that does need to be placated, too much IMHO), but becomes allowable, and maybe even desirable, due to an increasing self-confidence in Japan as a democratic and ultimately well-meaning nation-state within the Japanese political elite. It may be "woolly-headed" but I doubt anyone can find me a democratic country where security policy is actually made in the way technocrats would desire.
Anyway….to come full circle to your specific comments – I am pretty sure most of us are not averse to being challenged (although the word criticism has an expressly negative connotation for me – ie almost by definition not helpful) and would welcome it. Perhaps there maybe a cultural dimension to this – those of us from the Anglo-sphere, or the Japanese for that matter, tend to avoid the more gladiatorial view of idea authentication – possibly because we usually don't actually believe it achieves its stated ends! I guess everyone has their own individual style. It is probably also worthwhile to point out that some of us are incredibly busy so we may not always be able to delve into the level of detail that you provide in some of your responses. I am only doing so now because I am in a brief lull between the end of the course I was teaching and marking!
Nevertheless, thanks for your sincere reply and we are happy that you do find the website helpful and interesting. And of course ultimately for all of us, being younger researchers, it is a good learning vehicle for us also, so outside interaction and contributions to the discussion are much appreciated.
Regards to you also,
Corey
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 30, 2011
Gray, I would like to respond once more to some of your points as I think they are quite revealing about the nature of the present and historical security discourse in Japan.
The strategy I outlined in my article argues for the possession of capabilities which allow Japan to retain a maximum freedom of action and maneuver in light of the long term security environment. It envisions security action which would be defensive and where its core national interests are concerned precautionary. It would allow seek to maintain a qualitative technological advantage over peer competitors which would allow Japan to replace its narrow postwar definition of national security with the recognition that as a middle power Japan’s interests lie in a broader commitment to international security. It would seek security and a stable balance of power that hedged against both China and abandonment by the United States whilst making allowance for changing relationships among other powers in the region. It aims at the maintenance of a balance of power in East Asia which provides Japan with a measure of security and which allows it to hedge against the tragic history of great power transition. This commitment to repose would not exclude acting strategically to revise elements of the status quo to accord more with Japan’s interests or vision of national security. A political equilibrium is not an end but a beginning.
Re: the use of the term “battlefield” I was thinking in terms of a “area of operations” but I take your point sincerely that such a conflation of the two might be misleading in the context of a discussion of disaster and humanitarian relief. But I think you are conflating the role that drones have played in Afghanistan with the multidimensional use of drones in disaster relief operations specifically in the aftermath of the recent earthquake in Japan.
The idea that there were not “significant” command and control problems in the JSDF response in Aceh and during the triple disasters is quite simply not true Gray. The recent disaster has exposed detailed limitations in the ability of the SDF to maintain the tempo of operations over a sustained period without significant U.S. assistance and support. The reality of the SDF and CRF response to the triple disaster has once more raised important questions about its capacity to deal with nontraditional security threats and the implications of these shortcomings on the trajectory of the evolving role of the SDF. I therefore am not as sanguine as you are on the performance of the SDF.
I find it very revealing that you argue that the “China threat” only began around 2003-2005 or during the Bush administration. This is a breathtaking misreading of history which ignores over a decade of gathering Japanese concern over the implications of the substantive economic, military and political threat that China represents to Japan. China’s actions in the Taiwan Straits, its nuclear test, nationalistic education and China’s increasingly assertive posture towards Japan and its interests in the region have engaged the concern of Japanese political leaders and military planners. It also I fear reveals a deep misunderstanding and misreading of the Bush administrations pragmatic strategy of engagement with China whilst strengthening and transformation its alliances in the region.
On Yoshida: To argue that Yoshida’s strategy was one of transforming supreme weakness into renewed strength that concealed the reality of rearmament beneath the cloak of ambiguity, It was a logic product of his political philosophy and acumen that he recognized both the need for rearmament and its potential dangers. What I refer to as decades of sterility is in fact the reactivity of Japan’s institutions of national security which did in fact flow from the choices that Yoshida and his successors made. The hobbling of the defense industry that you argue is central to Japanese development is a highly ambiguous affair and claim. The arms industry is central to the techno-economic cord in Japanese security thinking which continues to the present.
On North Korea, I disagree with your assumption that it was the “defining threat” to the Japanese nation and which drove BMD development. If you read Ishiba Shigeru it is clear that the threat of North Korea was used opportunistically to secure the necessary political and bureaucratic support for the acquisition of long term defense systems whose aim was of course to limit the North Korean threat but also an specifically to deploy a “theatre” missile defense system which would limit China’s ability to target U.S. and SDF bases in Japan in the event of a regional crisis in the Taiwan Straits and which would permit US forces and the SDF to maintain the ability to act decisively without the fear of China’s rapidly growing arsenal of missiles.
The narrow definition of Japanese security that I am referring to is the definition of national security that you seem to be implicitly supporting which is tied to the limited postwar definition of Japanese interest. If you cannot see the abiding importance and deep political, intellectual and ideological continuities between the early postwar years and the present then I would respectfully suggest you attempt a deeper engagement with the actually history of Japanese security discourse during this time. One cannot understand the present security discourse and the options which are being debated in the present without understanding the origin of those debates. Its often been my experience that the elementary problems of politics never come as clearly to light in their immediate and simple urgency as when they are first formulated and when they receive their first challenge.
Once more thanks for the deep engagement with the issues raised by more article, I appreciate it.
Andrew
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 30, 2011
Sorry I didnt proof read this part, it should read that
Yoshida’s strategy was one of transforming supreme weakness into renewed strength that concealed the reality of rearmament beneath the cloak of ambiguity, It was a logic product of his political philosophy and acumen that he recognized both the need for rearmament and its potential dangers. What I refer to as decades of sterility is in fact the reactivity of Japan’s institutions of national security which flowed from the evasions and choices that Yoshida and his successors made and their ambivalence towards the reconstitution of an independent military institution. These evasions and the artifice which the SDF was cloaked in have had profound implications for the strange evolution of the postwar armed forces. Yoshida's protégées specifically Ikeda and Sato took a strategy which Yoshida had constructed to limit Japanese military rearmament in order to reconstitute its economic power and made it into a permanent feature of postwar security. Yoshida was very clear in interviews and articles that he did not support the idea of Japan as a "mercantile state" which is associated more with Kosaka Masataka and Yoshida's successors than with old one man himself.
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 30, 2011
Once more thanks for the deep engagement with the issues raised by my (not more!) article, I appreciate it.
Andrew
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Gray says:
May 30, 2011
Thanks for the clarifications Andrew. I feel now that there are definitely some areas on which we agree, some where we probably agree but are mis-communicating and others where we are probably strongly opposed – which is a reasonable basis for good debate. I do have a clearer understanding of your key points at any rate.
There are still some areas I would like to address (referring to Yoshida's plan for a mercantile state I was speaking of short terms intent rather than long term strategy, I didn't actually state that the hobbling of defense was central to industrial development, etc.). At this point though dragging things out in argument of minor points might only make the whole more confusing. If you're attending Kyoto Uni. at the Yoshida campus there are certainly more direct ways to discuss such issues. In any event, my thanks once again for the clarifications and comments, very much appreciated.
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Andrew Levidis says:
May 30, 2011
Thanks for the chance to work through some of the issues in my article Gray, I actually really appreciate the ability to engage in-depth on these issues. I am presently based at the Yoshida campus of Kyoto Uni in the Law Faculty so if you are around it would be interesting to catch up and discuss these issues.
My email is: alevidis@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au
Cheers,
Andrew
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Robert says:
Dec 31, 2011
Why do you ignore the biggest factor driving any decision(foreign,defense,etc,) by Japan.That is the U.S. I read all the articles by you guys and you talk as if any Japanese pm or diet has had any real power in determining Japan's future trajectory. Japan is like the U.S.state of Texas post war. Yes independent once but not anymore.Japan carries on the trappings of independence but you know as I do that that is not true.Yoshida did exactly what the U.S. allowed him to do.It was not this great, thoughtful, act of self determination.You talk as if Japan had some sort of free hand in this.You know they didn't and they still don't.The U.S. will dictate just what type of direction security and foreign policy Japan will take.The U.S. does not want any change in the current set-up with Japan.As long as the U.S. maintains their position in Japan then
Japan can play at being independent all they want but the second any action by Japan(independent foreign policy,offensive military etc.)is attempted then the U.S.will see it as a challenge to their priveliged position in Japan and will not be tolerated. It is frustrating to never see this addressed as if it is just not true when it is the biggest issue facing Japan.
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Mark says:
Jan 2, 2012
Actually, the US has been trying to get Japan out of its shell since the early 2000. Of course, we are not going to see Japan becoming the UK of the Pacific due to constitutional restriction or expect a 180 degree transformation in an instant.
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Robert says:
Jan 2, 2012
What the U.S has been trying to do is get Japan to do some financing of expensive waepons systems,perform some rear area logistics ,and lend some credibilty to some of our "adventures".The U.S has no intention or desire to see Japan do much more than that.This I think is a shortsighted mistake. It is imho very important to force(yes force)Japan to address some of the issues that keep Japan from becoming a real ally.Ego,"the way it has always been",and a general arrogance keeps us from seeing that we may need a stronger ,more capable Japan on our side vs what we may have now. There cannot be a discussion concerning
japanese politics,defense, or policy decisions without addressing the overbearing role the U.S. plays in the process. We just basically forced Hatoyama out recently and whatever one may think of him he was the elected leader of a supposedly sovereign nation.I can only imagine what we in the U.S. would do if another nation tried to pull a stunt like that here.
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arkhangelsk says:
Jan 2, 2012
I'll say that it is more accurate to say that that was what the Americans settled for getting Japan to do. The Americans have a lot of influence on Japan, needless to say, but they don't get everything they want either.
If America really had its way entirely, of course Japan won't be an equal to America, but they would, for example, have sent some combat troops rather than engineers to Iraq.
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Mark says:
Jan 3, 2012
Japan invested a lot in the BMD system both the US and Japan use in their respective navies. To say Japan isn't shouldering a lot is naive. They can only do what is currently allowed in their constitution.
Hatoyama as PM was the wrong choice for Japan in the first place. His wishy-washy, flip flopping on domestic and foreign policies that doomed his administration. Think of him as the John Kerry of Japanese politics.
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Tri-ring says:
Jan 2, 2012
Well Japan is shielded by article 9 of the constitution so it would be hard for the US to force Japan in doing whatever they want. Another point is Japan really doesn't have a strong motive like the US maintaining peace around the world placing puppet regimes to follow US's whims.
The reason for the US wanting to maintain the status quo in the middle east and why they are against Iran is rooted in control of transaction of oil.
10 years ago before 9.11, all oil transaction was done through the US dollar at the two major oil trade markets located in New York and London.
All nations purchasing oil needed to trade their own currency into US dollar first in order to make transaction. This gave US federal reserve banks an unlimited supply of cash flow which they can utilize to invest on their own as long as they had the correct balance. This is what drove the US economy and it is within the US vested interest for oil transaction not to be disrupted.
What changed was Iraq after the first Gulf war was under an embargo and was desperate in obtaining imports so they negotiated with the French to trade oil with Euro, this is what triggered the second gulf war, not any phony WMD accusations but a possibility that the oil transaction monopoly maybe broken.
Again the US is facing this threat with Iran creating their own International Oil Bourse which circumvents the traditional oil trade market in London or New York. The transaction currency allowed includes Euro and Yen so the cash flow decreased for the federal reserve banks. This movement is now moving beyond the borders of Iran and Russia and Brazil have their own plans in creating their own oil Bourse (or joining with Iran)dropping a heavy shadow amongst speculative investors.
When this happens it will be the end of US economy as we know it heavily relied on investor banks and various investment trades at wall street since the US economy with a very large trade deficit and little industrial basis to export to gain foreign currency her financial sector does presently.
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Robert says:
Jan 3, 2012
There are imho two things that would shake Japan enough to adress their inane policies and constitution.A war or attack from another state,or unilateral action from the U.S.The U.S. could, if they really wanted to,make the Japanese address article nine but I am coming to the conclusion that the U.S. is not interested in that. I think that they are actually asking Japan for things that they know Japan will not do unless the U.S. takes drastic action and then using the fact that Japan says oh we cannot do that to gain even more leverage within Japan as in more entrenchment within the defense role,more assets brought over,and more justification for needing all of those bases.If you are a guy who sees no problem with the U.S. becoming even more of a 800# gorilla within Japan fine but I see a problem down the road when we require some possible help and our strongest "ally" in that region(which is the biggest long term challenge for us imho)is not legally allowed to fight with us due to a constitution we wrote! Again it is ego,the ways things have always been done,arrogance and I will add another today a detachment from reality that is driving some of the decisions the U.S. is making and that is a poor choice of criteria to ensure long term hegemony.
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Robert says:
Jan 3, 2012
Well one could be a bit cynical and argue that BMD is (was) another tool in the U.S. toolbox to placate,satisfy,soothe,whatever the case may be a Japan that might be getting jittery and casting about for some real deterrent.A fully equipped,capable,armed to the teeth,possibly nuclear(and for the record I think Japan going nuclear would be a disaster but playing devils advocate here)wouldn't really have a need for the U.S. now would it? Anyway I digest(Family Guy reference there)Hatoyama may have been the wrong choice(he was Japan's choice though) but it was imho a bit overboard the way we (the U.S.)reacted when we thought that there might be someone in Japan who had the gall to tell us what we should or should not do in their country!That is not how the light of the world should act. Maybe a two bit third world nation but we can afford to be gracious and still get our way.Anyway back to my point(I did have one I think)The only challenge to the U.S has and always has been economically.That is what has won us wars,made us a hyperpower etc.China has looked at the mistakes the pretenders have made and if (and I know this is a big if)they continue like they have been then they will rival us if not overtake us.We may need a ally who you know can actually fight and atm Japan cannot do that.I think it is shortsighted for us to let ego,arrogance,and other silly reasons keep us from doing what we may need to do regarding Japan. I think our influence(I am being nice here) is far too much in that country and I am becoming more convinced that the powers that be are keen on it remaining so.If we did not have a significant challenge in front of us I'd say hey let's keep on keeping on but I think we do and it may require more of a normal relationship with Japan then what we have.
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Mark says:
Jan 3, 2012
I think its more of the Japanese politicians lack of communication skill in addressing the issue of Article 9, or why the need to relax the ROE regarding Japanese PKO in other parts of the world.
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HB Pencil says:
Jan 3, 2012
I always felt that the discord between the US and Japan during Hatoyama's brief tenure was very insightful and at the same time entirely predictable.
It was insightful because as Mark suggests, there is a fundamental communication and even knowledge gap within Japanese society on defense and security issues. Consequently, Hatoyama's plank for renegotiating the Okinawa agreement really didn't get the scrutiny or weight it deserves.
However the outcome after the election was entirely predictable and the blame in my mind resides heavily in Hatoyama's court. It wasn't so much that the US put the screws to Japan… though absolutely the DPJ's proposals on the face of it would hurt them. However what Secretary Clinton and other representatives really only wanted clarity of what his plans were for Okinawa. The reality is that he didn't have a plan, just an empty campaign promise. I think pretty quickly it became apparent the entire idea was badly conceived and he did not have any way of actually negotiating or doing anything about it. The outcome: a policy reversal was likely given the difficult issues involved. This isn't really a situation unique to any country. Back in the 1990s Republicans in the United States Congress said they'd cut all funding to the UN… it never really occurred because the reality hit rhetoric and the former won. Same happened here. I think if Hatoyama was actually a shrewd politician he would have found some compromise (less forces deployed, or sharing of current bases ect.) in order to get some sort of political win but actually mitigating US concerns. He didn't and it led to his resignation.
I don't really have that much of an insight into the area, it was more what I gathered from various accounts I read, and discussions ongoing when I was in Japan last year.
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Tri-ring says:
Jan 3, 2012
It's not about communication skills or any other skills a politicians would muster.
To alter the present constitution you'll need a nation referendum with 2/3(3/4? don't remember which) voting in favor which is not going to happen with present status.
The only way the US could persuade the Japanese populous would be to retract the present mutual defense treaty and pull out of Japan entirely which would be a nightmare for the US losing all assets within Japan vital in monitoring the region.
In essence the US will kill the relationship in the process they what to fortify.
You can't have cake and eat it too.
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Mark says:
Jan 3, 2012
No politician nor government can sway Japanese public opinion if neither has a way of addressing why the status quo needs to change in light of the current situation in the region.
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arkhangelsk says:
Jan 3, 2012
They don't only need a 2/3rds, they need 2/3rds that are able to agree on what the new text would be like. You can probably assemble 2/3rds Japanese that agree Article 9 should be changed in some way, but they are broken down into so many factions that even if some amendment is made now, the end result would be highly unsatisfactory.
In such a case, the present statement is as good as any really. It is almost amazing how much interpretative room has been quietly inserted into the present version.
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Robert says:
Jan 5, 2012
I still think that if the U.S. really wanted to they could force Japan to make some serious changes.I am thinking that the U.S. does not want the kind of changes I think should happen(constitutional change,deterrent abilities,offensive,albeit limited,capabilities).I can see where the U.S. would be unsure about these things regarding Japan because with these capabilities the U.S. has little purpose in being in Japan with the way they are now.I believe that is a little shortsighted and will possibly be a detriment to our overall position in N.E.Asia should things shake out a certain way.The U.S. can move the Marines around the Pacific and out of the Japanese island of Okinawa(and Japan altogether) and tell the Japanese that the alliance requires Japan to create a true marine corp.Close down Futenma altogether,do not open another base.This will soothe the Japanese citizens of the Japanese island of Okinawa(a long term gain),couch it as a repostioning and not reduction(which it will be)so as to keep China guessing,and lastly it will force(yes force) Japan to address some of the issues we have discussed.They will have to address logitics,they will have to find the money,thus making them bone up on finances,they will have to look at the offensive side of a marine corp,and they will have to discuss their own lack of capabilities.This will ineveitably make them discuss that constitution.This may not make then change it but it will make them talk about it seriously for the first time when those Marines are seen leaving out of there.
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Mark says:
Jan 5, 2012
The current doctrine for the JSDF is reactive defense (correct me if I am wrong). My understanding with the Order of Battle, especially with the Ground Self-Defense, is the Ground Forces will be mobilized if the enemy has establish a beachhead (again, I may be wrong with this assessment).Under any circumstances, I don't think they are allowed to conduct a retaliatory strike against a belligerent nation or entity.
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Robert says:
Jan 5, 2012
I don't quite understand what you are saying.Are you saying "under no circumstances are they allowed to conduct a retaliatory strike against the nation that has established the beachhead?
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arkhangelsk says:
Jan 5, 2012
Not under the current doktrina (I use the Russian variant of doctrine here b/c it seems most appropriate) of sensyuu bouei (dedicated sticking to the defense, less literally Non-Offensive Defense). If any retaliatory strikes are to be mounted, it'll be the Americans doing it (the sword and shield relation).
The Japanese equipment set reflects this doktrina (a fact the whining Chinese or Koreans never bother to mention). Even if they tried to launch said retaliatory strikes, well until recently they don't even have JDAM. Now they do but they still don't have oh, jamming pods or anti-radiation missiles and I don't think F-2 even has a terrain-following function. How well do you think the counterattack will go in the face of say a competent IADS?
30+ years before Non-Offensive Defense was even proposed by Larionov and Kokoshin, the Japanese started to execute it… except L&K assumes both (or more sides) will cooperate and the Japanese are playing it unilaterally.
They, however, do not have to wait till the enemy hits their shores. Very clear intent of attack is considered enough to satisfy the provisions of Article 76 (the one concerning Defense Deployment) in the SDF Law. So they can attack the Chinese (example) landing fleet, and again in tune with their doktrina, the Ground Self Defense Forces are armed with coastal-based antiship missiles and Type 96 Multi-Purpose missiles that can be used to attack the landing craft.
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Mark says:
Jan 5, 2012
This is when the US comes into play. This is why I said the current doctrine is "reactive defense". Japan's ability to conduct a retaliatory strike is non-existent due to the nature of the "self-defense" concept.
Koizumi (or his immediate successor) floated the idea of "preemptive strike" into enemy territory (North Korea) if an attack on Japan is imminent, however, I believe it was completely shut down by the Diet.
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Robert says:
Jan 7, 2012
Ok so that being said what are the chances that that policy can be effective against a well equipped navy.I am not talking about the USSR navy as it never was like the U.S. in it being a expeditionary type force.The Chinese are from what I see building a expeditionary type navy with the intent of disrupting the status quo(and let's not forget the SOKors who are doing the very same with one eye on Japan imo although I am aware of the U.S. tie in).The current set up even without the changes afoot is asinine but in light of the changes in East Asia I am not quite understanding the reticence on the U.S side to really utilize Japanese resources to counter.We seem to be ignoring some domestic issues and plowing ahead with things without taking into account that we have a chance to make some needed changes that will bring our allies more in line with our goals and thus freeing up some of our assets to better utilize them. Also if we see a "leaner"military over here I will eat my hat.Never going to happen too many people making money that we don't have.
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arkhangelsk says:
Jan 7, 2012
Japan's defense policy is actually one of the reasons I believe that Americans don't have nearly as much control as you think they have. America's thoughts, IMO, can be summed up with "I'm really feeling sorry I ever sicced Article 9 on you. Move, Japan, MOVE!"
The Japanese policy is not written with military efficiency in mind. It is made mostly to satiate liberal politicians and citizens enamored with Article 9 and proclaiming fears of militarism. It wasn't that long ago when the SDF is not allowed to defend its own bases in peacetime on the basis that it is a police function.
It is far from ideal but maybe it is the only way we even got a SDF, such peaceniks are some Japanese.
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Robert says:
Jan 13, 2012
I don't know.The U.S has residual astuteness and shrewdness( I do believe as we get further from some core beliefs that this is becoming less "We must be the ones to set the example"and more "we have to make sure we get ours" which is a mistake in my mind)but I am still not convinced that the decision makers are seeing the whole picture here as regards Japan. It seems like with the exception of the U.S. wanting some logistics,some added credibilty,and some weapons developement help that the U.S. is pretty much content with the status quo.How else do you explain the insane tenacity with which the U.S. demands FRF.This,from what I can ascertain has less to do with strategic requirements and more to do with tbh I don't know what it has to do with,ego,occupation mindset,it does not make a whole lot of sense to me.Let's look at what the U.S could gain by simply not building FRF and closing Futenma.Right off the bat Japanese citizens of the Japanese island of Okinawa have a tremendous amount of reasons for the U.S. to leave entirely simply vanish.Kadena and Yokosuka are now even farther insulated from the spotlight(as regards U.S. presence),we can then go to the Japanese and say ok we have taken the hit on this one and if you are serious about our"relationship" then you need to step up and step out and do the things that we require you to do(serious discussion about your defense limits,Japanese amphib corps of your own,more and more robust deployments around the world,filling the gaps we just created by doing the right thing on the Japanese island of Okinawa.It is sort of like a friend who always wants to go but never has money for gas,if he really wants to he will find the money but he has to be made to do it.As long as there are no consequences to him he will continue to mooch.There may be a time in the mid to longterm future where (if the U.S. continues as we have been for the last 40-50 years)we may need more from the Japanese then we currently do.It behooves us to take the reins here and force Japan's hands as it were and get them moving in the direction we may need them to move in.If we wait on the Japanese we may wait for ever,again as I repeated time and time again the Japanese have no incentive to change the staus quo, they seem content to ride us as long as we will let them.I am unsure if the potential threat(which is economic and that is why I think it is the most threatening)evolves the way it could then we cannot rely on the current set up in my opinion.We have got to make the changes we need for both of our well being
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