Image rights: navy.gov.au

Very much under the radar comes the news that the Adelaide-class guided-missile frigate HMAS Sydney (FFG 03) is about to join the US Seventh Fleet, where it will be  ”embedded” with a US carrier strike group operating out of Yokosuka. Launched in 1980, the warship is only one of four guided-missile frigates operated by the RAN, and it was a mainstay in supporting US operations around Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s role specialization is Undersea Warfare and its commander Karl Brinckmann served as Deputy Director Underwater Warfare in Navy Strategic Command.

While the Chinese Xinhua news service has connected the deployment to tensions on the Korean peninsula, other analysts have suggested that the more important symbolism may relate to the Japan-Australia strategic partnership. Peter Jennings, the head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), is quoted as saying that the frigate operating from Japan indicates that ”we [Australia] are getting close to the Japanese”. Furthermore, Benjamin Schreer, also at ASPI, provides the following insight while commenting on Australia’s new defense white paper:

Integrating the warship into the George Washington Carrier Strike Group (CSG)—as opposed to usual short-term exercises—is an important development. Again, Australia is the only Asia-Pacific ally to do so. Moreover, the ship will take part in real-world operations in the CSG’s ‘Area of Operations’, which includes the Senkaku Islands where tensions between Japan and China are still running high. By doing so, not only does Australia make an active contribution to US military operations in Northeast Asia, it also signals to China (and Japan) on which side it’s on.

Jennings notes more forthrightly that the “[HMAS Sydney] would have a role to play in a conflict if that [Senkaku conflict] happened.”  While unsurprisingly concerned about this move and others, the World Socialist Web Site provides some useful background on increasing military contacts between the US, Japan, and Australia, and Australian presence north of the South China Sea. In addition to the involvement of Australian troops in the Foal Eagle exercises between the US and the ROK earlier this year, Mark Church and James Cogan (WSWS) also note that:

Earlier in February, the Royal Australian Air Force participated in the Cope North 2013 training exercises in Guam. The sizable Australian contingent included seven F/A-18A fighter jets, an E-7A Wedgetail early-warning aircraft, refuelling and transport aircraft and 230 support personnel…Cope North began in 1978 as a joint US-Japanese operation designed to improve air force co-ordination. It is now developing as a key training exercise for the air forces of the countries that comprise the de facto US coalition against China. Australia participated for the first time in 2012 and South Korea took part with a limited presence this year. US Pacific Air Force commander, General Herbert Carlisle, has indicated that New Zealand and the Philippines will most likely participate in the future…The exercises represented a further development in the military relations between Australia and Japan.

Update: Time’s Kirk Spitzer provides more detail on the deployment:

The Sydney’s responsibilities will include providing air defense for the GW and its fleet of escort vessels. It is only the second time in recent memory that an allied warship has joined a carrier group here for purposes other than scheduled exercises…The GW group includes two Aegis-equipped cruisers and seven destroyers, along with the Sydney. Carrier groups typically go to sea with at least one submarine lurking nearby. The Sydney is a 1980s-vintage frigate that was recently upgraded with Standard and Evolved Sea Sparrow anti-aircraft missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and carries two anti-submarine helicopters. Nominally, the ship will follow the same rules of engagement as other vessels in the task force, though the Aussies would not necessarily be dragged into each and every fight if shooting occurred.

Image courtesy of VietnamNews.vn

Shameless Self Promotion Alert: I would like to direct readers to World Politics Review where I participated in an email interview on Japan-Vietnam security cooperation. This is a topic I could have gone into more depth on, and will at a later date, as it is an interesting and quietly taking place development.

JS Atago. Ministry of Defense photo.

I recently finished listening to T.X. Hammes on the Midrats podcast for the second time. If you don’t listen to Midrats you should, particularly when they address Asia/Pacific. I think Sal gets Asia wrong at times, but he and Eagle1 ask good questions. They have good guests, and they let their guests talk (sometimes on and on and on…but that’s what you’re there for.) I’ve liked T.X. Hammes ever since I read The Sling and the Stone several years ago. It’s refreshing to hear someone who can move from state vs. non-state asymmetric warfare to a potential confrontation between the United States and China, and the B.S. meter doesn’t move.

Hammes lays out a very good case for a strategy of Offshore Control in this article here [PDF]. To wit: Offshore Control is a strategy, while AirSea Battle is not. Offshore Control advocates the U.S. military to stand off China’s coast and strangle it economically, without strikes on the Chinese mainland, with the theory of victory that China will fold when it’s economy can no longer tolerate war. On the other hand, AirSea Battle advocates carrying the war to the Chinese mainland, with the theory of victory…well, hopefully at some point the Chinese would just realize they were beat and give up. Offshore Control is a strategy tailored to the diminishing resources of the U.S. military, while AirSea Battle requires a large buildup of new weapons systems.

I like Offshore Control, a lot. One of the things I like most about it, that Hammes only briefly alludes to, is that Offshore Control takes into account cultural and other psychological factors. Striking the Chinese mainland in and around major cities will be humiliating to the Chinese Communist Party. There is a chance that the CCP would view such strikes, in view of the Chinese people, as a loss of face that would require escalation. What that escalation is I’d rather not speculate but it obviously wouldn’t be good. Particularly for our allies. On the other hand, keeping a conflict at sea or in the air makes it easier for the Chinese government to hide — but still feel the effect of — damage to China’s ability to wage war. The CCP can tell their people whatever they want about how the war at sea went.

Remember when the Japanese junta didn’t take into account American cultural factors? It went poorly for them. Apples and oranges, of course, but the point is that culture is an often under-appreciated factor in war.

P-1 maritime patrol aircraft.

So how would Offshore Control affect Japan?



It protects Japanese civilians and the Japanese mainland. Unlike AirSea Battle, Offshore Control does not mean offensive strikes on the Chinese mainland. Without those strikes, there is a chance that conflict would not escalate to ground strikes on any country, particularly Japan, and action would be limited to the sea and air. While there is always a chance that China might strike Futenma, Naha, Sasebo, Maizuru, Yokota, Zama,  et al. without provocation, Offshore Control gives the Chinese no urgency to escalate to that level. Which is good, because most of those bases are ringed with civilians, and the Circular Error Probable and quality control of Chinese weapons is probably not all that great.

It’s an easier sell to the Japanese people. Offshore Control is a defensive strategy. It doesn’t involve things that the Japanese public dislikes, such as offensive operations. It doesn’t involve Japan cooperating with a country that will be attacking Chinese soil. It simply involves coordinating defensive operations with a longstanding ally.

It doesn’t freeze China into a military adversary of Japan. China isn’t an enemy of Japan, but it isn’t an ally, either. It’s something new. China is one of Japan’s top three trading partners — if not the top trading partner. That relationship is important to China, and it’s also important to Japan. Let’s be honest: how is China supposed to feel trading with Japan when Japan is actively allying with a country planning strikes on the Chinese mainland? Japan’s relationship with China is complicated enough and doesn’t need the added friction.

Japanese Patriot PAC-3 air defense systems deploy to Okinawa. Via JapanUpdate.com.

Offshore Control doesn’t require a drastic revamping of the SDF. Japan’s role in Offshore Control would be strictly defensive. Japan would be required to defend its own territory, and nothing else. In fact, the SDF’s role in Offshore Control is pretty much the same as it has been for the past sixty years. Due to its long sea border with China, Japan merely defending Japanese territory restricts Chinese freedom of action and contributes to the war effort. Japan can continue focusing on escorting convoys from 1,000 miles out, ballistic missile defense, guarding the various straits with submarines, and generally defending Japanese territory. Precisely what it’s already been doing for decades.

It doesn’t require Japan spending money it doesn’t have. A lot of people see Japan’s increase in defense spending as a good thing. But with Japan’s economy in the doldrums and some of the highest government debt in the First World, it just doesn’t have the money to pursue a meaningful defense buildup. A (tiny) one year increase is a start, but it’s really only a gesture. 

Offshore Control would not drive a defense budget increase and could be done within the existing budget framework. Japan’s roles and missions in Offshore Control would be the same as they have been for the last fifty years, so it’s not unreasonable to assume that the SDF doesn’t need a hydra of new, expensive weapons systems. (Maybe to drive a defensive anti-access/area denial strategy around the Senkakus, but a little money in A2AD goes a long way.)

It doesn’t require Japan to work closely with a U.S. that won’t tell it what the plan is until the war starts. The U.S. has been notoriously tight-lipped about allied participation in AirSea Battle. Under AirSea Battle the war starts and Japan knows…squat about what the U.S. plans to do, and what it’s supposed to do. Maybe the Japanese brass knows. But if I were the average Japanese person on the street, not knowing would make me nervous. By comparison, during the Cold War the average West German had a very good idea what the American V Corps would do if the Warsaw Pact rolled over the border.

It doesn’t require modifying the Japanese constitution. I do think that Japan needs to eventually normalize its status as a country with a natural right to a regular armed forces, but I’m not sure it needs to be done now. To be honest, Abe’s recent statements on aggression and World War II are a bit unsettling, and I’m not sure I want to hand him the keys to the car right now.

Offshore Control is a safe bet for Japan. For once, change is not good.

Kevin Maher, Former State Department Japan Country Director: “Japan, Let us fight together!”

Former State Department Japan Country Director, Kevin Maher stated, “Lighting up the Fire-Control (FC) radar and lock-on is equivalent to an actual attack, and can be interpreted as an act of war.  If a radar-lock is confirmed, the commanding officer has the authority to take a counteroffensive action.  That is a common understanding in the international community.”

Not only Japan, but the U.S. is also in shock after PLA(N)’s second FC radar lock-on.  Although China is denying the accusation, the U.S. State Department’s spokeswoman Victoria Nulan told reporters, “We are convinced there was a fire control radar lock-on.”  Jun Kitamura, a U.S. Navy affiliated Think Tank member, shared: “There is an unspoken rule that the Navies in the world shall not conduct an FC radar lock-on on each other unless the intent is to attack.  The U.S. Navy members have stated that the Chinese Navy routinely breaks the Navy rules and is a disgrace to the Navies in the world.”

China has been routinely violating the territorial waters and air space since Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands — these are clearly provocative actions, but Maher states that Japan must take a “firm stance” against such provocations, “This is not the time to take a conciliatory stance with China.  Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama stated that the Senkaku Islands should be debatable territory, but that is absurd.  China wants the Senkaku Islands to be ‘debatable territory’ — after the Senkaku Islands, the step will then be to debate (sovereignty of) Miyako Islands, and mainland Okinawa too.  This is why both the U.S. and Japan must take a firm stance against China.”

The FC radar lock-on was conducted only because China knew Japan would not fight back.  If the U.S. military was placed in a FC radar lock-on, how would they have reacted?

Senior Researcher for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Richard Fisher analyzed, “There are Rules of Engagement (ROE) for FC radar lock-on in the U.S. military.  The military is views a ‘lock-on’ as an attack, so they are authorized to counter the attack immediately.  The U.S. Navy has been in that situation during the Vietnam and the Gulf wars, and it was standard procedure to counter the lock-on with an attack as means of self-defense.  In fact, if the adversary force can be seen, the Navy will determine if the weapon is a naval gun or a missile, and may try to jam the radar while monitoring the adversary’s next move.  However, if the adversary force cannot be seen by the naked eye, the chance to immediately retaliate via launching a missile increases significantly.”

Sankei Shimbun Washington Branch reporter Yoshihisa Komori stated, “When I was covering the Vietnam War, the U.S. announced that an aircraft under lock-on immediately fired back, and that seemed to be common practice.  I honestly find that the Japanese media is wrong for calling the ‘lock-on’ as ‘radar projection’.  That’s Japan being considerate towards China unnecessarily.”

So, if Japan were to be under attack by China, how would the U.S. military respond?

CSIS Fisher answered, “U.S. will immediately begin dialogue with Japan, should China and Japan face conflict in high seas.  If it is a substantiated attack on Japan by China, U.S. will support Japan under the premise of executing its rights within the realm of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.”

Maher also commented, “There’s always a chance that China may attack Japan in the next phase.  In such case, the U.S. will not stand back and watch as its ally faces an attack.  It is critical now, more than ever, to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security structure.  The security structure does not mean that the U.S. will one-sidedly defend Japan.  The U.S.-Japan security structure means that the two nations will defend Japan together.  Therefore, it is critical that Japan demonstrate commitment to strengthening its defense capabilities.  Although it is a good inclination that the defense budget will increase since the administration has changed to LDP, but that alone is not good enough.  At this point, JMSDF and JASDF are comparable to the PLA’s military power, but China’s military is expanding its power rapidly and Japan must be ready.  Japan must expedite and expand its defense plans, such as the construction of AEGIS ships, BMD, establishment of JSDF bases in the southwest islands, introduction of the F35, etc.  The plans to review the National Defense Program Guideline and US-JA Defense Guidelines will begin soon, and that too is a critical step, because it can be utilized to strongly demonstrate to China how committed Japan is.  Some say that the U.S. may take a step back if JSDF strengthens its defense capabilities, but that is not true — that will only deepen the alliance between the two nations and will place Japan as an equal partner to the U.S.”

(Regarding this incident here.)

Who is responsible for the Chinese Navy’s radiation of Fire Control Radar (FCR)?

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs broke their silence on 8 February and released a statement in countering Japan’s accusation of a FCR lock-on by stating, “Japan twisted the truth and released the ‘one-sided’ information.”

That same day, an affiliate of PLA lamented as he shared, “Of course we did it…”  He continued, as he sighed, “We knew the full scale of the incident shortly after Japan announced the radar projection incident.  Naturally, we knew that the radar used was not a warning control system either and understood who gave the orders to radiate the FCR and why.  The individuals responsible aren’t trying to hide any details about this incident.  The only issue the senior officers had to deal with was the fact that these individuals were not violating any military regulation, nor did they violate any direct orders.  Basically, no one told them that they could NOT use the FCR, so the only thing the Chinese government could do in this case was to deny all accusations.  Of course, the government fully understands how internationally dangerous and insane this action was but they can’t acknowledge that…”

– Radiating FCR warrants a missile attack in return

Naturally, China’s ruling leadership were also fully aware of the severity of this action.  A Chinese foreign diplomat shared, “The Foreign Relations Department was mortified and in sheer panic mode.  When the Foreign Ministry spokesperson was asked if China was not aware of this incident, the spokesperson answered after a long silence, ‘That is a safe assumption.’  Judging from the attitude the spokesperson displayed, there was frustration in the Foreign Ministry, especially knowing that the PLA probably did not consult them in advance.”

In fact, there is an overt disregard towards the Foreign Ministry by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  With China’s fundamental concept of “power comes from the gun muzzle” the PLA has unwavering power in the nation.  In China, the military is sacred and are protected by privileges and immunities, which give them the right to do whatever they deem appropriate.  It is not unusual that the Foreign Ministry is not aware of the PLA’s activities.

In 1995 while China was in diplomatic negotiations with the Philippines, the PLA began constructing a building on one of the reefs the two nations were in dispute over.  The Philippine government strongly protested, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry had to rush to verify the incident.  Essentially, the Chinese Foreign Ministry does not have a clue over what the PLA is doing.

So, who is responsible the FCR projection incident?

A PLA affiliate shared the truth, “The FCR projection was directed by the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLA-(N)].  Their chain-of-command was not aware of their decision.  The order was given by the vice commander (VC) via the Chief of Staff (CoS).  The CoS was promoted to his current position when the VC assumed his post.  They have been very close throughout their careers and were fully aware of the implications of their decisions — the intent was to increase tension between Japan.  There wasn’t an intention to cause tension to the central party or to their chain-of-command, but to conduct a ‘heroic act’.  From their perspective, they rightfully did what they needed to do.  Regardless what their intentions, their actions do not reflect the intent of the central government — the PLA(N) has always been much more aggressive than the government.”

The PLA(N)’s position in the military chain-of-command is not equivalent to the structure of other foreign armed services.  While the Air/Ground/Navy forces are all equivalent in the power structure in foreign nations, that is not the case in China.  The Army has the ultimate power within PLA and the Navy is merely a part of that organization.  There are four departments in the Army which function as the “control tower” in PLA: the General Staff, General Political Department, General Logistics Department, and General Armaments Department.  Essentially, the Army General Staff decides what missions the Navy will take, and although the Navy has its own strategic department, their existence is merely an extension of the big Army plans office.

However, that does not mean that the PLA(N) does not have any discretionary power.  Ordinarily, the highest decision making agency is the civilian leadership, the Central Military Commission (CMC) — naturally, Xi Jinping is at the top of that hierarchy.  The CMC’s military policy is objectified/developed and orders given throughout the military via the General Staff Department.  However, detailed orders are not given at the field level.  On top of that, if the “field” is the East China Sea (ECS), it is critical in PLA’s eyes to maintain a firm stance against Japan, so if an action was taken to demonstrate a “strong China”, then such act does not warrant punishment — in fact, it warrants commendation.  Basically, there is a huge gap in the understanding of such act internationally and domestically.

PLA has the image of demonstrating unwavering loyalty to the Communist Party, but some experts analyze that a growing laxity in discipline is causing serious issues.  The prime example used to prove that point is the EP-3 incident, which occurred in 2001.  A mid-air collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3E intelligence aircraft and a PLA(N) interceptor fighter jet occurred when the PLA(N) jet flew too close to the EP-3E while flying in the vicinity of the Hainan Island.

A Japan Self Defense Force affiliate commented, “This was an unfathomable incident that shook the world.  The cause of the incident was the Chinese becoming too hot-headed and lacking rational thought-process in their decisions.  But that was not the biggest concern back then.  The U.S. government was concerned about this incident going out of control, so they called the hot line to get in touch with then-General Secretary of the Communist Party, Jiang Zemin, but he found reasons to not take the call for over eight hours.  Essentially, the PLA conducted an act without the endorsement of their government, so the government was scrambling to figure out how to deal with the situation, and was in sheer panic mode.”

The Chinese government is always facing unexpected political challenges with PLA.  A former member of the State Council pointed out the risks of being at the mercy PLA’s fundamentalist nature and anti-Japan sentiment, “The VC who ordered the FCR projection is not happy with the government’s temporizing stance towards Japan.  This individual is a dedicated military senior officer, who is not involved in side businesses like other high ranking officials in PLA — he prides in his clean career and is a frightful stiff … which those surrounding him find it troublesome.  Although it may not make sense, if the VC had something (corrupt) to hide — like other officials profiting from the government — the government would have more control over him.  If he was profiting from international peace, he wouldn’t jeopardize that.  However, he does not have any other interest than his military career — which could make him that much more risky.”

It may be inevitable for PLA(N) to believe in having a strong stance against Japan, as they routinely face Japan in the ECS … not to mention their historically strong victim mentality towards Japan.

A former JSDF member who served as a Defense Attache shared, “The PLA(N) does not have much history of operating in the high seas, so they’re not familiar with how to face a foreign military.  Therefore, their ‘country cousin’ actions are often caused due to lack of experience and understanding of the internationally-accepted protocols of the sea.  For example, if they conduct an exercise in the vicinity of Japanese waters, naturally, JMSDF will monitor their every move — yet they become quite agitated and complain, ‘Why does JMSDF have to follow us every where?’  Japan is doing everything right by international norms, but since China doesn’t understand the basic concept of operations at sea, their level of frustration is increasing daily.”

The controversial act of the PLA(N) — especially the FCR incident — has received criticisms, even within internal Chinese government.  On 7 Feb, Li Keqiang — anticipated to be the next President — met with the executives of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) to exchange thoughts and opinions.  SOA is an organization that dispatches ocean surveillance ships which often violate Japan territorial waters; but during this exchange of opinion, these members actually complained about the recent aggressive acts of PLA(N).  However, the same logic does not apply to waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands, because in their view, those islands are rightfully China’s — so aggressive actions taken around the Senkaku Islands are justified from their standpoint.

Essentially, there’s no crime in taking actions out of patriotic fervor.  The bottom line is, the Communist Party no longer has strong control over the PLA — and that fact alone should concern all, because even if Japan continues to avoid conflict with China, their fundamental views and “patriotism” may escalate the tension between the two nations.

Fishing Agreement zone in purple with Senkaku Island’s 12 mile territorial zone excluded in middle

Following on from Michal Thim’s ASW post, which contains the details of the deal, the Japanese media reaction has been illuminating, and it appears to be the number one story alongside North Korean missiles on most Japanese news sites.

Something appeared to be stirring in late March when it was reported in the Japanese media that Taiwan was to relax its demand that Japan, at the very least, officially recognize the existence of a dispute over the Senkakus. This decision apparently took place in a mid-March meeting between President Ma Ying-jeou and his Cabinet ministers. Then suddenly yesterday the Japanese media started reporting that a deal was to be signed within 24 hours. Today’s reporting (日) on the deal confirms that Japan believes that it is making the most significant concession by allowing for fishing inside the EEZ that would theoretically surround the Senkaku Islands. This will open up the fields to competition, at the expense of Ishigaki (Okinawa) fisherman, particularly for the prized kuro-maguro (northern bluefin tuna).

While the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Suge has already argued publicly that the agreement was to restore order over the East China Sea fishing issue and not to “split” China and Taiwan over perceived cooperation surrounding the Senkaku sovereignty dispute, no one, including the Japanese media, believes him. Both Jiji (日) and Yomiuri (日) report that an additional reason for the agreement is indeed to silence repeated Chinese calls for PRC-ROC cooperation over the territorial dispute. Jiji notes that domestically Ma has been forced to become somewhat less of a “hardliner” on the territorial dispute, and Japan’s willingness to make significant concessions played a part in pushing Ma towards relaxing his stance (Richard Katz, of The Oriental Economist, notes in a NBR post that many in Taiwan wanted to prioritize the fishing issue over the territorial issue, as also noted by Michal).

The Jiji article also notes that in February the Taiwanese foreign affairs ministry rebuked perceived Chinese “intervention” in Japan-Taiwan fishing discussions. Ma also announced in the same month that Taiwan would not collaborate with China on the territorial issue. This reportedly gave a boost to negotiations by assuring the Japanese further, thus allowing them to make the final concession subsequent to the official announcement of a willingness to shelve the territorial dispute by the Taiwanese side later in March. By agreeing to shelve the territorial issue, this now puts some pressure on the PRC to follow suit, as it has been reluctant to do so since what they view as Japan’s attempt to alter the status quo in 2012.

The Yomiuri however in another story (日) was the most explicit and informative in its reporting. Confirming Michal’s suspicions that Prime Minister Abe was a critical actor, it notes that the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei) played a leading role in pushing the negotiations to their conclusion. Without leadership from the top, negotiations would have likely remained bogged down due to Japanese officials’ worries about hurting Okinawan fishing interests. Abe himself apparently became particularly concerned from September 2012 about the geopolitical implications should Taiwan and the PRC look to collaborate on challenging Japan on the issue.

According to the Yomiuri, when Abe came into office in December he therefore immediately instructed the agencies involved to proceed to concluding the deal. There were other signals according to Yomiuri. For example, at March’s two year memorial of the 3/11 triple disaster, Japan accorded Taiwan “equal status” to other nations’ representatives in terms of the seating arrangement, ostensibly in recognition of the overwhelming generosity of the Taiwanese people in contributing to the recovery through charitable donations. This led to the Chinese representative refusing to attend. This was not only appropriate recognition of Taiwan’s contribution, but apparently a strategic signal to Taiwan in the context of the still difficult negotiations then ongoing.

Nevertheless, the Japanese Fishing Agency (suisancho 水産庁) still continued to oppose a deal. But the Kantei eventually overruled its objections and from that point the decisive concession regarding access to prized tuna fishing stocks was able to be extended to the Taiwanese in April. The Taiwanese were able to claim a significant domestic victory for the Ma government, and the Foreign Minister at the signing ceremony boasted that Taiwan had increased its officially recognized fishing areas a further 4530 square kilometers.

So the story goes, anyhow.

Taiwan’s temporary enforcement line (Source: China Post)

Japan and Taiwan have signed a ground-breaking agreement on fishing rights that leaves China isolated in the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands. According to Taipei Times, major elements of the agreement are:

• intervention-free fishing zone for Taiwanese fishing boats in waters between 27° north latitude and the Sakishima Islands, Okinawa Prefecture;
• furthermore, Taiwan is given an additional fishing zone of 4,800 square km outside Taiwan’s temporary enforcement line (see red dotted line on the photo);
• fishermen from both countries can operate in a large area within the designated zone without being subject to the jurisdiction of the other side;
• smaller area of the zone, where Japanese fishing vessels frequently operate, is under joint management by the two governments;
• provisions under the agreement do not apply to waters within 12 nautical miles (i.e. territorial waters) surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands;
• last but not least, Article 4 of the agreement states that agreed conditions have no effect on each side’s sovereignty claims over the islands.

This truly seems to be a major breakthrough. Although the agreement has not been concluded out of the blue and progress was reported at the end of March, the pace of how last round of talks resulted in agreement is rather surprising considering that resumption of talks that were stalled since 2009. What were the major incentives for Taipei and Tokyo to move forward?

From Taiwan’s perspective, reaching a deal on fishing rights is the optimal result.  Taiwan does not have physical control over the islands and has limited means and thus basically no reason to try and acquire physical control. Domestic public opinion does not allow for a strong anti-Japanese stance and Taiwanese are little interested in territorial nationalism. Thus, fishing rights are the only issue that the public really cares about and this is well reflected by politicians, both from ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who face major elections every two years. Naturally, Taiwan needs to consider China’s position and it is clear that Beijing won’t take this deal lightly. Yet, Ma’s administration clearly believes that it would be able to maneuver through Chinese anger. It is a dilemma for Taipei but at this point Tokyo simply delivers something tangible that Ma Ying-jeou would be able to claim as a success at point, especially given his approval rating has sunk to a staggering 13%. Aligning itself to China, an option that Ma himself recently strongly rejected, is politically risky and cannot possibly deliver tangible results for Taiwan as Beijing does not have control over the area.

It appears that that Japan is the giving side here. Yet, it is not a bad deal for Tokyo for a couple of reasons. First, Japan has been concerned with the increased activity of Chinese law-enforcement vessels in close proximity to the Senkaku Islands as part of Beijing’s clear attempt to alter the status quo in its favor. From Tokyo’s perspective, removing Taipei as a claimant allows it to focus fully on China. Second, the dispute is an unnecessary spoiler of otherwise good relations between Taiwan and Japan. Third, the deal effectively isolates Beijing. Taiwan now has an agreement that safeguards its fishing interests, and despite the provisions of Article 4, we should expect Taiwan to be much less vocal about its sovereignty claims. It would be interesting to see what the role of Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe was in facilitating the agreement. Given that talks have been stalled for so long before he was elected, it is plausible that he pushed for more conciliatory stance towards Taipei.

To sum up, both Japan and Taiwan and its respective leaders had strong domestic and foreign policy incentives to reach the agreement at this given moment.

Obviously, Beijing will not be very excited with the agreement. The Taipei Times article quotes a China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson as saying: “We are extremely concerned about Japan and Taiwan discussing and signing a fishing agreement,” and “We hope that Japan earnestly abides by its promises on the Taiwan issue and acts cautiously and appropriately.” However, China’s options are not limitless. It cannot push too hard against Taiwan because that could only result in a negative reaction which could hamper the more Beijing-friendly KMT’s chances of winning elections in 2016. Similarly, too strong action against Japan – China’s major trading partner – is not likely to produce any results. Trade relations between Beijing and Tokyo are governed by WTO rules, thus limiting the scope of economic punitive measures. In addition, Shinzo Abe is not exactly a person who is likely to yield to Chinese pressure. Article 4 of the agreement further helps both sides to argue that they have not made any territorial concessions, a face saving formula especially for Taipei.

Taiwan-Japan Agreement map (Source: Taipei Times)

DD-124 Mineyuki (Source: MSDF)]

In a move that is likely to be depicted as a further militarization of the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), the government is considering transferring decommissioned MSDF destroyers to the JCG to “improve patrols around some disputed islands in the East China Sea,” Kyodo News reported in early March. The discussion has been in the works since November 2012 and having cleared the MoD, the ball now lies in the JCG’s court.

Up for grabs are four recently and soon-to-be commissioned Hatsuyuki-class vessels: the Mineyuki and Sawayuki plus two more vessels. (If someone knows which, please tell us in the comments!) Representatives of the JCG conducted an inspection of one of these vessels at Yokosuka in January.

A key concern is how to modify the vessels for civilian use. The Asahi Shimbun discusses the need to remove the vessels’ torpedo and missile launchers, but in addition to the weaponry, there is the issue of the engines: the Hatsuyuki-class uses gas turbines whereas the JCG uses diesel engines. According to the Asahi article, the JCG is asking the Ministry of Defense to bring the MSDF crew over to the Coast Guard to help train the new crew. The article notes that the JCG’s patrol vessels operate with a crew of only 40, whereas the Hatsuyuki-class vessels typically operate with a complement of 200.

The Japan Coast Guard has been boosting its presence around the Senkaku islands since they were nationalized last September. According to the Asahi, since that time, its patrol vessels have all been assigned to the 11th  Regional Coast Guard Headquarters in Naha, Okinawa to deal with Chinese government vessels, even leading to a cancellation of its 2013 Fleet Review.

The JCG is looking to create a patrol unit dedicated to the Senkaku islands by thge end of FY2015. Among those patrol vessels in Okinawa, only seven are over 1000-tonnes. The JCG want another 12 by that time, but they face a three-year lead time and the necessity of extending the service life of some of their current clunkers.

The Hatsuyuki-class is a 4000-ton destroyer and their adoption, assuming the Coast Guard has the available manpower, will allow the JCG to cover the gap left their current procurement and service schedules.
Of course, it seems inevitable that the adoption of the Hatsuyuki-class vessels will lead to a severe diplomatic caution from China and a likely increase in Chinese government activity in the disputed region. Given Prime Minister Abe’s tougher stance on Chinese naval intrusions, that seems to be a risk he would be willing to take.

But it provides a good opportunity to reflect on a few memes that pop up in wider media commentary on Japan’s security doctrine and military development. As with many media commentaries, the problem often resides in the framing rather than the information itself. Any reference to Japan “moving away from pacifism” will be an inherently loaded characterization, and while not all who do refer to it buy into the idea that this is necessarily a bad thing, it will unfortunately reaffirm the knee-jerk narratives around Japanese remilitarization which prey on pre-existing stereotypes regarding Japan.

First, the concept/frame of “moving away from pacifism” is kind of a meaningless distinction to make in the first place. Japan has never been formally “pacifist” and has never been as purely idealistic (or naive, if you take your cue from DC) as many believed. In this sense, the “moving away from pacifism” is a double fiction. Defensive-orientated defense (senshu bouei 専守防衛) and certain antimilitarist norms, established in the public imagination and institutionalized politically much later than 1947, are a better starting point for understanding Japan’s initial “non-offensive” security doctrine. I wonder if it would be so hard for commentators to use language such as “Japan’s security doctrine continues to incrementally evolve in line with regional developments and Japan’s changing international identity after periods of societal debate.” Of course, that would be boring. But appropriate.

Second, the specific claims about Japan’s security evolution, while not incorrect per se, are probably not quite as meaningful as they might seem at first glance, at least as conceptualized within the frame of “weakening pacifism.”

Let’s take them in turn:

1) SDF, legitimacy and public opinion

The article seems to frame the increased legitimacy and warmth felt by Japanese public for the SDF in terms of it being a reasonably recent phenomenon, likely in reaction to Chinese naval expansionism. Certainly the support for the SDF is at a record high, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 triple disaster.

However this is the peak of a long-term trend dating back to the end of the Vietnam War. The legitimacy of the SDF was essentially settled in the mid-1970s when during normalization talks, the PRC, at a time when relations with Japan were going well, accepted the SDF as long as it remained committed to “defensive-orientated defense.” Essentially getting the tacit thumbs up from China alleviated further concerns about the “partial peace” that Japan had signed on to in the Cold War that worried a number of liberals and conservatives alike (as represented by the “coerced” inclusion in the US alliance system and “unequal” security treaty, and exacerbated by Japanese connections to the Vietnam War). With this tacit acceptance of the SDF by the Chinese, even the Japanese Socialist Party in 1975 had to change its stance on the SDF from it being undeniably unconstitutional to it being (vaguely) acceptable until it can be otherwise eliminated after peace was achieved in the Far East. When the USSR started to go somewhat feral in the late 1970s and the early 1980s the Japanese public decided that a “comprehensive peace” with the USSR as it was constituted in the pre-Gorbachev era was not really worth having, and the SDF came to be increasingly seen as an actual defense force and not simply a token supplement to US Far East strategy. There is some evidence that top Chinese officials even encouraged Japan to strengthen elements of its SDF in the early 1980s as a balance against the USSR. In any respect, while the PRC may now worry, arguably somewhat opportunistically, about Japanese “militarism,”¹ the cat of SDF legitimacy has been out of the bag for a while. It was further strengthened in the 1990s by Japan’s humanitarian and UNPKO commitments, improved relations with Russia, and its internal (and increasingly external) role in responding to natural disasters. A desire for maritime balancing against China is only the latest factor to strengthen the SDF’s legitimacy. Support for SDF in public life is however not simply a function of support for an increased military footprint broadly, and certainly not just anti-Chinese sentiment.

2) BMD and Collective Self-Defense, namely:

In recent years, the two countries have jointly developed a ship-borne missile system capable of shooting down ballistic missiles. Mr. Abe is calling for a broader interpretation of the postwar constitution, which restricts Japan to acting only in “self-defense,” to include acting in defense of allies. Mr. Abe says this would allow Japanese forces to shoot down a North Korean missile heading toward the United States, something they cannot now legally do.

If Abe and others engineered a constitutional change which allowed for the full embrace of collective self-defense then I would concede the point. If there was a reinterpretation that essentially allowed the Japanese to go and fight with US ships outside of the East Asia region under the pretense of “protection,” I may also concede the point depending on the details. However, it is hard to see anything in the above paragraph that suggests a contradiction with Japanese “pacifism,” at least in terms of how it has been practiced since the mid-1970s in terms of defensive-orientated defense. BMD-circumscribed collective self-defense specifically would be a significant change for Japan’s military doctrine, but mainly in the sense of it being a logical evolution. As a sign of Japan moving away from “pacifism,” then on its own it is unconvincing.

3) JCG and MSDF strengthening:

While the military spending increase passed by Mr. Abe and his governing party is small (0.8 percent compared with China’s double-digit gains in recent years), it is intended to bolster the defense of Japan’s southwestern islands, including the disputed ones, known as the Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.

We have 11 years of consecutive decreases in the actual real value of the  JSDF budget, and then in a year of the highest tensions since the 1970s between Japan and China, we have an increase. This 0.8 percent increase was only a third of the initially proposed increase of 2.3 percent. Most of this increase has indeed been committed to the MSDF (along with more money for the JCG outside of the budget). But the MSDF has a relatively limited, defensive mandate, mainly committed to managing Japan’s extraordinarily complex maritime security environment. Even here many experts would argue that it is under-resourced to accomplish even its core defensive mandate, let alone broader regional and global roles.

To be sure, for a period of time (but a period of time much shorter than most imagine) the MSDF was restricted to “home islands” focused maritime missions. However the focus on “extra-territorial” missions (ie well beyond Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu) was officially embraced strategically in the early 1980s and tactically from well before that.

Again, the official strategic reconfiguration of the Japanese maritime doctrine and actual resourcing of it, as symbolized by the DPJ’s “dynamic deterrence” concept – important? Yes.

A sign of “moving away from pacifism”? Less convincing.

4) The purchase of the F-35

The new military budget also adds weapons that just a decade or two ago would have seemed overly offensive for Japan’s defensive forces

There has been considerable argument about whether the F-35 was a good purchase by the Japanese government. There has been some angst about whether Japanese contributions to the F-35 manufacturing consortia will lead to undermining of the “spirit” of the arms export restrictions, particularly if the US exports to Israel. These are both reasonable discussions.

However, the F-35 in of itself is not particularly problematic in the context of Japan’s past practices. Japan has after all fielded jet fighters since it regained its independence. So what could be the issue?

One issue could be the “innate” capacity of the F-35 to be refuelled mid-air, which of course means that it could in theory make it to the DPRK and back and carry out an “offensive strike.” However while the F-4EJs were initially delivered by the US to Japan without the in-air refuelling “probe” between 1972 and 1981 when the final F-4 was built by Mitsubishi, they were all retroactively fitted with this capability from that point onwards. F-15Js and the Mitsubishi F-2 were both subsequently delivered with in-air refuelling capability built-in. So we are at 3 decades here at the very least since this change.

Another much feared possibility could be the ability of the F-35B variant to be launched from Japan’s helicopter “carriers” to accomplish supposedly similar objectives.  This may happen in the future if Japan purchases the F-35B which is the STOVL variant, and if it fits its DDHs with the necessary fixtures such as a ski-jump needed to efficiently launch F-35Bs from these so-called carriers. This hasn’t happened yet, and it would be pretty obvious if it did.*

Strike capability? The F-35 has been described by its backers as a “flying weapons system” and not just a simple fighter. “Low observability“, its advanced weaponry and targeting equipment, and its advanced C4ISR capabilities certainly without doubt make it a potential offensive instrument. I would concede that the Japanese are hedging their bets with the F-35 purchase, especially in terms of how access to stealth-technology may assist in the ATD-X indigenous fighter program, as will the Japanese involvement in avionics and engine manufacture. In the past Japan did go out of its way to order F-4EJs without the AN/AJB-7 computer for precision bombing. But again this practice ended some 30 years ago, and Japan has over the last decade been equipping its fighters with JDAMs. The F-35 may be a more complete, advanced and integrated weapons system, but it is hardly novel in terms of giving Japan completely new attack capabilities.

With the exception of stealth of course. But even here, along with precision strike capabilities, stealth is useful in many situations other than circumventing and suppressing enemy air defenses and destroying the infrastructure of other countries. The F-35 is big news for other reasons however, such as its use in reconnaissance roles. This again fits within the context of Japan’s maritime and defensive-defense doctrine, which is a story for another day.

5) “Attack Submarines”

The larger budget will also add another attack submarine to strengthen the Japanese Navy’s ability to hunt the new Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning

This one I am not quite so sure about. Japan has fielded conventionally-powered, non-nuclear missile equipped “attack submarines” for the longest time. This was made official in the 1976 NDPO when 16 was decided to be the magic number. This was adjusted up to 22 submarines after the 2010 NDPG/Mid-Term Defense Plan. Essentially, Japan will have in operation more Soryu or other advanced submarines than they would have under the old build-up plan over a period of time, as the lifespan of existing boats will be extended. These boats are certainly advanced in a whole range of ways, and give Japan’s subsurface fleet greater range.

Could they hunt down the Liaoning? Why, that would be a rather excellent use if the Liaoning and future Chinese “strike carriers” were operating close to Japanese territory. Still, this is not the major focus of Japan’s submarine fleet – other nations’ submarines operating around Japan’s strategic choke points/SLOCs are, on the other hand. Offensive instruments, they are not.²

6) Japanese training with US forces in and outside Japan.

The article does a pretty good job of covering these developments. The SDF operating overseas with the US Marines and other branches of the US military is a genuine and novel change in Japan’s security doctrine and worthy of greater attention, as I have given it on a few occasions at the Shingetsu News Agency.

However, even here it is hard to say that a “movement away from pacifism” is a useful frame of reference. Japan has many islands, is involved in a dispute over islands at the edges of its maritime defensive perimeter, and the DPJ’s 2010 NDPG expressly pointed to “offshore island defense” as an extension of its maritime doctrine. Is it so unnatural for Japan to want to develop this capability?

Of course it would be reasonable to point out the potential slippage between Japan acquiring the ability to conduct amphibious operations for “offshore island defense,” and acquiring it as a means of projecting power into other nations’ territory. However, in terms of the potential for a Japanese “Marine Corps” being set up to engage in combat and project “offensive” amphibious power around the world, we would certainly be getting ahead of ourselves.

While Japan’s 3 Oosumi-class transports could be useful in this regard, they lack the ability to beach on unimproved shores. They have however instead performed very useful roles on multiple occasions in Japan’s UNPKO and disaster relief operations. The US Marines apparently operate ships very similar in many ways to Japan’s Hyuga-class destroyers (technically 護衛艦 or “escorts” in JMSDF speak) which serve useful expeditionary functions in terms of moving hardware and troops around the world for amphibious missions. What is notable however is that Japan declined to equip its helicopter-carrying destroyers with the well deck that the US Marine equivalents have (although two of the newer ships do not have well decks, relying on Ospreys to do the shore transportation work if required – another capability Japan would have to acquire – although the previous Defense Minister Morimoto Satoshi did suggest that Japan acquire the Osprey, although not, ostensibly at least, for this purpose).

While assuming a hedging of bets, or  ”strategic flexibility,”³ is operating in this case (and others), it could well be that Japan’s “carriers” are, after all, actually intended primarily to be Anti-Submarine Warfare platforms with useful humanitarian (and other) functions, and not a surreptitious, devious way of acquiring a “strike carrier” capability or to gain the capability to transport combat troops and expeditionary units around the world.

Japan’s military doctrine is certainly evolving. And Japan’s military hardware has given it significant capabilities it didn’t have at least up until the 1980s. But there is perhaps something in the old saying that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.” One could argue that, rather than leading Japan away from a fictional pacifism, the last few years have seen a consolidation of Japanese security policy and doctrine around an expanded maritime-focused defense after a period of political opportunism and misguided strategic experimentation during the Koizumi administration. Perhaps the PRC can be thanked for facilitating this well-needed focus.

The story for me over the next few years if Abe stays in power is whether Abe will overreach to please domestic and international interest groups, or will remain disciplined and focused on Japan’s immediate security needs.

Update: H/T to Asia Policy Point we have a discussion on this very issue. APP’s Mindy Kotler, the Wilson Center’s Shihoko Goto, Stimson’s Yuki Tatsumi, and Professor Thomas Berger were part of the conversation. FWIW I don’t think the issue was really addressed all that well – the framing at the start was unhelpful, and frankly, with four smart and perceptive contributors trying to get a word in the conversation didn’t exactly flow. Having a discussion with each of them individually would, on the other hand, have been quite interesting.

* In a discussion on the NBR Forum mentioning this post there were doubts raised about even whether the Hyuga and Ise themselves could really be configured in a useful way to launch the (still under development) F-35B. Dr Alessio Patalano was good enough to write in and suggested that the currently-in-service Hyuga and Ise would struggle with the F-35B. Rather he suggests the  two new 22DDH being built are more likely to support such an arrangement if desired. It should be noted that development/construction of the new DDHs is not dependent on the success of the F-35B project (which is not guaranteed), thus suggesting that being able to place STOVL craft on the vessels is not the primary focus for the MSDF in wishing to acquire the even bigger counterparts to the Hyuga and Ise.

¹ Although arguably part of the deal was that China would also remain a “defensive”-orientated actor, which it essentially reneged upon with its new 1985 naval doctrine and post-Cold War military modernization subsequent to 1992 and the Law Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

²  You’ll need an institutional subscription, but Dr Alessio Patalano provides the definitive word on this insight. It is worthwhile noting that neither Japan’s submarines nor its destroyers are equipped with Tomahawk Cruise Missiles like the US’ Ohio-conventional/Virginia-class attack submarines or the US model for the  Kongo/Atago destroyers (Arleigh Burke Flight II) are.
³ Ibid.

As for the back story, the process appeared to be initiated in May 2012 when a senior Australian official inspected the Soryu at the MSDF’s Kure Base in Hiroshima Prefecture. Then in June 2012 the issue was further discussed during a visit to Australia by Admiral Masahiko Sugimoto. Soon after that in July 2012 Rear-Admiral Rowan Moffitt, head of the Future Submarine Program, and Dr Alexander Zelinsky, the Chief Defense Scientist, traveled to Japan to further inspect the Soryu. Then in September 2012 Defense Minister Stephen Smith confirmed that Australia was indeed considering at least the submarine’s propulsion systems as part of a technology deal.

All things being equal it would seem like this deal is likely to be done as it offers strategic benefits for both sides. However, both sides may still need to be somewhat flexible as the two sides have bottom lines that may stand in the way of deep collaboration. First, the Australian side will demand that the subs be built in Australia to enhance Australia’s shipbuilding industry centred on Adelaide, as well as to keep Australian tax dollars and jobs onshore. While Japan in December 2011 relaxed its arms export restrictions, which has allowed this deal to be considered in the first place, these restrictions were however ostensibly relaxed to allow Japanese defense manufacturers to engage in the joint development of sophisticated weapons systems with other partners. A simple one-way transfer of technology was not necessarily envisaged, and in any respect, the technology that gave birth to the Soryu has been nurtured over the last 30 to 40 years in Japan and the Japanese government, MHI, and Kawasaki are not likely to let go of the full suite of technologies and design specifications without considerable benefits being extracted in return. If Japan was unable to extract any offsets from the transfer of the technology then it might get cold feet at the last minute and back out of the deal. More likely is that the two sides might only come to an agreement on a partial transfer, perhaps of the propulsion/AIP-related system technologies only.¹ This would still be a big deal nevertheless, especially coming on the back of similar hardware-related collaborative developments in the UK-Japan defense relationship, and with something similar with India surely not being too far away.

Extra: The Sydney Morning Herald article above provides a few quotes worth emphasizing that illustrates the closely guarded nature of technology as well as its possible strategic and tactical suitability in light of Australia’s defense goals:

 ”The Japanese submarine is out there, but it’s an enigma,” said Steve Ludlam, the chief executive of the Australian Submarine Corporation in Adelaide, likely to be a local partner in the new project. A predecessor, Hans Ohff, said: “We know more about Russian submarines.”

“They [Japan] have got a similar-sized submarine, in fact a larger submarine, with what would appear to be an extremely competent propulsion system,” he said. “Where is our problem area? Propulsion system. No other nation builds submarines of that size. They do. They’ve cracked it. Even if I was only going to buy their diesels, their main motor and their generators, I would still be in front. So engage with them collaboratively in sharing with them the more sensitive end of acoustic signatures and other stealth forms would be in good shape.”

¹To be sure the propulsion system is composed of these engines:
Kawasaki 12Ｖ 25/25 SB-type diesel engines (2)
Kawasaki Kockums V4-275R Stirling engines (4)
Electric propulsion motor (1)

http://www.khi.co.jp/english/news/detail/20120316_1.html

As noted below, for the AIP component of the propulsion system the original licence and components are from Kockums, but KHI builds the completed products and delivers them to the shipyards.